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ABSTRACT 
 Operating under the assumption that proportional representation (PR) systems 
strengthen rather than undermine democracies, scholars have largely ignored the question 
of how this particular system interacts with presidentialism to shape stability outcomes. 
This thesis challenges that understanding. It argues that presidentialism, in interaction 
with PR for legislative elections, reduces coalition-formation incentives and makes 
inter-branch conflict in Latin American democracies more likely. Through a 
cross-regional comparative analysis and case studies on the Chilean and Venezuelan 
democratic experiences, this thesis shows that presidential systems experience higher 
levels of conflict when not subject to the systematic coalition incentives regularly 
produced by parliamentary or plurality-presidential systems. It also indicates that 
institutional factors can shape governing coalitions, independent of traditional political 
divides.  Without electoral incentives to coalesce policy visions before elections or 
institutional mechanisms to ensure the formation of a majority coalition after the election, 
PR-presidential systems often create a multiparty result that is especially prone to 
inter-branch conflict and political crisis. 
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1 
I. RETHINKING PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION IN 
PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACIES 
Latin American republics were born in the age of Enlightenment. Liberal thought 
around the world influenced the independence movements of the 19th century and 
instructed the founding constitutions of these newly-formed nations. Though Latin 
Americans settled on presidents to replace their dethroned rulers, the constitutions they 
created were not simply imitations of the North American experiment.1 Rather, Latin 
American constitutional designers borrowed significantly from Europe’s own developing 
democratic systems.2 Latin American presidents would supplant monarchs, differentiated 
by derived popular mandates and fixed terms, but would otherwise have powers that were 
as similar to European heads of state as they were to U.S. presidents.3  
While most European regimes would evolve over time into parliamentary systems 
as monarchical powers commonly became circumscribed, Latin Americans instead saw the 
power of their executives grow relative to their assemblies.4 However, these diverging 
experiences did not stop Latin American republics from continuing to mimic European 
practices. Eventually, countries throughout Latin America would adopt proportionally 
representative (PR) elections for their assemblies, copying European systems that 
incorporated an array of ideological preferences into their parliamentary governments. 
While scholars have lauded European parliaments under PR for their stability and 
representativeness, presidential systems in Latin America have not been so praised. Rather, 
                                               
1 Matthew Shugart and John Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral 
Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 6. 
2 Tom Ginsburg, Jose Cheibub, and Zachary Elkins, “Latin American Presidentialism in Comparative 
and Historical Perspective,” Texas Law Review 89, no. 7 (June 2011): 1720; Shugart and Carey, Presidents 
and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, 6. 
3 Ginsburg, Cheibub, and Elkins, “Latin American Presidentialism in Comparative and Historical 
Perspective,” 1720; Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral 
Dynamics, 6. 
4 Ginsburg, Cheibub, and Elkins, “Latin American Presidentialism in Comparative and Historical 
Perspective,” 1718. 
2 
the Latin American experience instead has become a cautionary tale warning of overly 
empowered executives and societies not suited for democracy. 
What remains unclear is whether particular constitutional designs that excel for the 
European tradition fit appropriately in Latin American presidential systems. In particular, 
is PR equally compatible within a presidential system as it is within a parliamentary 
system? The presidential system of the United States has maintained plurality elections and 
winner-take-all districts for its legislature, encouraging pre-election coalitions that compel 
a two-party system. Parliamentary systems in Europe require a post-election majority 
coalition to form the executive. In Latin-American presidential systems, PR elections may 
make the formation of broad coalitions less automatic and less stable than those 
incentivized through these alternate constitutional designs. 
Operating under the assumption that proportional representation systems 
strengthen, rather than undermine democracies, scholars have largely ignored the question 
of how this particular system interacts with presidentialism to shape stability outcomes. 
This thesis challenges that understanding. It argues that presidentialism, in interaction with 
PR for legislative elections, reduces coalition-formation incentives and makes an inter-
branch conflict in Latin American democracies more likely. I posit that the process that 
most Latin American countries use to elect their legislative and executive branches 
impedes the institutionalization of the checks and balances required to sustain the 
legitimacy of democratic governments, increasing the frequency of inter-branch conflict 
and constitutional crisis. I first test this argument through a comparative study of Latin 
American democracies during the era defined by the third wave of democratization. This 
study illustrates the correlation between an electoral outcome unique to PR-presidential 
systems and higher levels of inter-branch conflict. The thesis then turns to two case studies 
to evaluate the causal linkages between coalition patterns and political crisis. Both Chile 
and Venezuela provided long periods of democratic rule with clear and significant 
variations in stability outcomes. Understanding the evolution of coalition outcomes during 
this variation sheds light on whether instability led to coalition breakdown or whether 
coalition breakdown led to instability. 
3 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS DISCUSSION 
Despite the long tradition of democratic inspiration throughout the Americas, the 
road to democratic consolidation in Latin America has been troubled. While opinion polls 
illustrate that Latin Americans have maintained their favorable views of democracy in the 
abstract, the same polls also divulge frequent concerns with the effectiveness and quality 
of their own particular democratic governments.5 Instead of growing stronger, Latin 
American democracies have been plagued by street demonstrations and inter-branch 
crises.6 The experience in Latin America seemingly contradicts the assumption that, as 
long as democratic regimes simply endure, democratic institutions will strengthen over 
time.7 
There may be nothing more important to the security of the United States than the 
success of its allies’ democracies. Stable and well-functioning democracies have been one 
of the surest signs of international alignment with the United States and the embracing of 
shared democratic principles makes international peace more likely.8 Shared democratic 
values tie the Latin American region to the United States, promoting strategic partnerships 
in the hemisphere and enhancing U.S. security.9 However, unrepresentative governments 
can promote popular discontent that not only threatens democratic institutions but also the 
values attached to them. In the worst cases, inter-branch crisis can promote democratic 
breakdown entirely, severing shared democratic bonds and potentially leaving Latin 
American countries vulnerable to authoritarian impulses and the influence of adversary 
world-powers such as Russia and China.  
                                               
5 Arturo Valenzuela, “Latin American Presidencies Interrupted,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 4 
(October 2004): 6, ProQuest. 
6 Gretchen Helmke, Institutions on the Edge: The Origins and Consequences of Inter-Branch Crises in 
Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 2; Valenzuela, “Latin American 
Presidencies Interrupted,” 11. 
7 Helmke, Institutions on the Edge: The Origins and Consequences of Inter-Branch Crises in Latin 
America, 152. 
8 Bruce Russett, “The Fact of Democratic Peace,” in Debating the Democratic Peace, ed. Michael E. 
Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 58–81.  
9 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), http://nssarchive.us/
wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2017.pdf. 
4 
Repeated democratic crises also risk serving as kindling for a global movement that 
questions the efficacy of the liberal order. Latin American republics have repeatedly fought 
for liberal institutions, overcoming monarchs, dictators, and Marxists, most recently 
embracing a third wave of democratization at the end of the 20th century. Whether Latin 
America will continue on this wave or embrace an illiberal turn may depend on whether or 
not democratic governments can finally live up to the democratic vision that has 
historically inspired the region. This study indicates that the institutional designs of Latin 
American countries (and perhaps other countries such as Afghanistan that have 
incorporated PR into presidential regimes) have them fighting an uphill battle to form a 
stable and representative democratic government. Latin America, as well as constitutional 
designers around the world, can gain by further understanding how commonly accepted 
optimal practices, such as PR, fit within diverse democratic systems. In their constitutions, 
Latin American nations chose presidential governments while incorporating 
proportionately representative legislatures common to parliamentary systems. This study 
helps to determine the implications of that decision. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many approaches have sought to explain the causes of inter-branch crisis and 
subsequent political instability in Latin America. Preeminent arguments to explain the high 
frequency of political crisis include a particular Latin American cultural inclination that 
yields dominant executives, presidents allotted too much legislative power, and presidents 
that are too weak politically to effectively rule.10 However, by and large, this literature 
tends to take for granted the role of institutional design in shaping the onset of crises, 
assuming this to be a constant rather than dynamic variable. In particular, it neglects the 
increased variation in coalition arrangements made possible by incorporating PR 
legislative elections within presidential systems. 
                                               
10 Hugh M. Hamill, Caudillos: Dictators in Spanish America (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1992); Guillermo A. O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5, no.1 (January 1994) 
55–69, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1994.0010; Valenzuela, “Latin American Presidencies Interrupted”; 
Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. 
5 
1. Cultural Conflicts with Democracy 
A Latin American cultural preference for authoritarian leadership often filters 
through the subtext of even more nuanced discussions of Latin American government. 
While some directly single out an emphasis on family hierarchies, ties to Catholicism, or a 
prevalence of machismo masculinity in explaining the supposed Latin American partiality 
for authoritarian government,11 others who point to more complex factors that drive inter-
branch conflict and political crisis also describe a Latin American cultural proclivity for 
strong leaders. 
Guillermo O’Donnell, in his argument outlining delegative democracy, describes 
how legacy thinking contributes to the stubborn perseverance of a system in which 
“whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, 
constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally 
limited term of office.”12 According to O’Donnell, a perpetual cycle of social and 
economic crisis leads Latin American constituencies to seek not just a new government, 
but a salvador de la patria (savior of the country) that can unilaterally pull the country 
from the brink of disaster.13 With a conception of the proper exercise of executive authority 
based on authoritarian leaders of the past, Latin Americans, O’Donnell argues, seek 
presidents who operate independently of stymieing democratic practices.  
Arturo Valenzuela, in his critique of presidentialism in general, also bluntly 
describes a Latin American attachment to strong leaders, writing: “The overwhelming 
symbolic authority attributed to presidentialism leaps out from the pages of the region’s 
history and bestrides its politics like a colossus.”14 He, like O’Donnell, argues that 
presidents in Latin America are seen as the single true voice of the electorate, a belief that 
often encourages the president to bypass perceived encumbering democratic frameworks 
                                               
11 Hamill, Caudillos: Dictators in Spanish America. 
12 O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” 59. 
13 O’Donnell, 65. 
14 Valenzuela, “Latin American Presidencies Interrupted,” 16. 
 
6 
like legislatures. “The heavy symbolic trappings carried by the head of state,” Valenzuela 
describes, “combined with often-overblown folk memories concerning powerful and 
nondemocratic past presidents, lead citizens to expect that a leader must fix the country’s 
problems or face bitter charges of incompetence and corruption.”15 
2. Overly Powerful Presidents 
Another leading theory for a highly volatile political landscape in Latin America 
argues that their presidents have too much legislative power. O’Donnell laments the lack 
of horizontal accountability on the executive in Latin America, where presidents can too 
easily use an electoral mandate to supplant the legislature and overrun the judiciary. 
Valenzuela places the blame for democratic fragility on the presidential system itself, 
instead arguing in favor of parliamentary systems that make the executive branch 
responsible to the legislature. Rather than needing to get rid of presidentialism in general, 
as Valenzuela argues, Matthew Shugart and John Carey maintain that a properly designed 
presidential system which sufficiently limits executive authority can be advantageous to 
democracy.16 
Shugart and Carey do agree that more powerful presidencies are especially 
problematic.17 They contend that successful constitution designs for presidential systems 
must ensure that the legislative powers of the president are specifically delineated and 
thoroughly circumscribed.18 Shugart, in collaboration with Scott Mainwaring, found this 
especially important in systems in which the president does not have stable congressional 
support. “Having weaker executive powers,” they claim, “also means that cases in which 
presidents lack reliable majorities are less likely to be crisis-ridden, since the president has 
fewer tools with which to try to do an end run around the congress.”19 
                                               
15 Valenzuela, 12. 
16 Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, 286. 
17 Shugart and Carey, 16. 
18 Shugart and Carey, 286. 
19 Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, Conclusion, in Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin 
America, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 436. 
7 
3. Presidents without Support 
In their observation that presidential powers must be limited in minority 
governments, Shugart and Mainwaring joined a chorus of scholars who discuss the 
hazardous byproducts of a fragmented political system. Indeed, Gretchen Helmke claims 
that “it is difficult to find any serious scholar of Latin American institutions who has not 
acknowledged the dangers associated with  minority government, or pondered the various 
ways to reduce the fragmentation of party systems.”20 Whether due to weak political 
parties, as Kenneth Roberts, Mainwaring, and Valenzuela suggest, or a result of poor 
electoral design, as Shugart and Carey claim, this fragmentation can promote inter-branch 
conflict.21 Valenzuela contends that the challenge of building and maintaining wide 
support in a system of weak and fragmented parties inhibits the ability of presidents to  
fulfill their political mandates and promotes a hostile executive-legislative relationship.22 
Shugart and Mainwaring argue that presidential regimes function better “when presidents 
have at least a reasonably large block of reliable legislative seats.”23 
Gretchen Helmke develops her thesis to combine the concerns of strong presidents 
and weak partisan support. Building off the arguments advanced by Shugart and 
Mainwaring, she contends that the relationship between a president’s de jure power, 
granted by the constitution, and his or her de facto powers, accumulated through loyal party 
support in the legislative branch, is what drives inter-branch conflict. She determines that 
“contemporary presidential crises are fueled not by presidentialism per se, but by a certain 
mix of institutional and partisan features that precludes effective inter-branch 
                                               
20 Helmke, Institutions on the Edge: The Origins and Consequences of Inter-Branch Crises in Latin 
America, 161. 
21 Kenneth M. Roberts, “Market Reform, Programmatic (De)alignment, and Party System Stability in 
Latin America,” Comparative Political Studies 46, no. 11 (November 2013); Scott Mainwaring, “Party 
System Institutionalization in Contemporary Latin America,” in Party Systems in Latin America: 
Institutionalization, Decay, and Collapse, ed. Scott Mainwaring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2018), 34–70; Valenzuela, “Latin American Presidencies Interrupted,” 5–19; Shugart and Carey, Presidents 
and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. 
22 Valenzuela, “Latin American Presidencies Interrupted,” 12. 
23 Mainwaring and Shugart, Conclusion, 436. 
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bargaining.”24 Helmke claims that presidential regimes with strong formal powers but 
weak partisan support are especially crisis-prone, leading to bargaining failures that 
encourage both legislative efforts to impeach the president and also presidential attacks on 
legislatures to preempt impeachment.25 
4. An Incomplete Case for Weak Presidents? 
The solution to the problem of presidentialism in Latin America often seems to be 
to create a system that reduces presidential power enough to make it effectively 
parliamentary. Yet this is easier said than done. As various scholars have pointed out, there 
are no real-world examples of presidential systems transitioning to parliamentarism.26 In 
fact, the trend in Latin American constitutional reform is to grant the executive more, not 
less, power.27 
In Latin America, even the weakest presidential systems have succumbed to 
breakdown. The case study of Venezuela had long been used as an example of the success 
of circumscribed presidents. Shugart and Carey write, “we do not believe it is merely 
coincidental that the two Latin American countries that are, as of 1991, longest-lived and 
generally regarded as the ‘most’ democratic, are also two with the most highly constrained 
presidential powers over legislation… Costa Rica and Venezuela allow their congresses to 
be quite dominant.”28 The Venezuelan constitution of 1961 significantly favored the 
legislative branch at the president’s expense, requiring only a simple majority to override 
a presidential veto. This simple majority override could enable smaller opposition parties 
to coalesce to effectively shut out the president from the government.29 However, when 
                                               
24 Helmke, Institutions on the Edge: The Origins and Consequences of Inter-Branch Crises in Latin 
America, 14. 
25 Helmke, 17. 
26 Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, 3. 
27 Helmke, Institutions on the Edge: The Origins and Consequences of Inter-Branch Crises in Latin 
America, 161. 
28 Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, 277. 
29 Shugart and Carey, 278. 
 
9 
Hugo Chávez stormed to power with a significant electoral victory that was unmatched in 
the legislature, he used his popularity to rewrite the constitution and bypass legislative 
checks on his power. Helmke describes that “Chávez not only eliminated obstacles to 
getting his policies enacted, but also deprived the opposition of the major institutional 
routes it could have potentially used to get rid of him,” suggesting a motivating factor for 
changing the constitutional order was the insecurity caused by his weak partisan support in 
the legislature.30 The constitutionally weak presidency of Venezuela was not enough to 
prevent Chávez from rewriting the constitution of one of Latin America’s most established 
democracies for his own advantage—in fact it appears to have been a contributing factor. 
5. Representative Assumptions 
In these important texts on Latin American presidentialism, the assumption that PR 
best suits the representative needs of Latin America’s diverse electorate goes unchallenged. 
Works by both Helmke and by Shugart and Carey incorporate the results of G. Bingham 
Powell’s studies on electoral systems into their considerations of the value of PR 
elections.31 Powell, after analyzing over 150 elections spread across 20 countries, finds a 
“persistent superiority of the proportional influence designs in linking the citizen median 
to the policymakers,” (and even more so the influential policymakers).32  
However, Powell’s data set is almost exclusively European. His analysis is thus 
constricted to a region with a much different electoral and political history than Latin 
America. More importantly for this discussion, his research does not include an example 
                                               
30 Helmke, Institutions on the Edge: The Origins and Consequences of Inter-Branch Crises in Latin 
America, 15. 
31 Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, 11; 
Helmke, Institutions on the Edge: The Origins and Consequences of Inter-Branch Crises in Latin America, 
162. 
32 G. Bingham Powell, Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 243, 253. 
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of a proportionally elected legislature with an independently formed executive.33 The 
result in a parliamentary system, where PR has found much of its success, still forces broad 
coalitions post-election. As Anthony Downs notes, “voters in multiparty systems are 
indeed faced with definite and well-integrated policy sets, but none of these sets will in fact 
govern them.”34 Despite the ability of a voter to support a more particularistic policy 
platform in a multi-party system, the need to form a post-election coalition requires a series 
of compromises, though left to be determined by the political elite rather than the voter. 
But the conclusions cited by Powell were not forced to reconcile the fact that, in Latin 
America, the political elites are not required to form coalitions and make these 
compromises. In fact, in Latin America, the most influential policymaker is often not 
responsible to the post-election bargaining that Powell argues moderates PR systems.35 
Rather, as noted by the scholars of Latin American presidentialism referenced above, it is 
not uncommon for Latin American presidents to “go it alone,” neglecting entirely the post-
election bargaining forces that constrain Powell’s PR systems. 
The story particular to the adoption of PR elections in Latin America also colors 
the common conception that PR elections best promote a diverse and equitable electorate 
in presidential systems. Laura Wills-Otero explains that PR in Latin America was not 
adopted to empower the voices of forgotten minorities. Rather, PR was adopted by 
established political elites to preserve their waning influence, looking to dilute the effects 
of a changing electorate. Throughout Latin America, Wills-Otero notes, “PR was 
introduced when the electoral arena changed significantly and threatened the power of the 
                                               
33 Powell’s 2000 work cited by Helmke studies: (single-member districts) Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, United Kingdom, United States; (Mulitimember districts): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, France, Ireland, Japan, and Spain 
(France does have an independently elected president, but a cabinet whose formation is dependent upon the 
legislature); the cases studied in Powell’s 1989 work referenced by Shugart and Carey is the same, other than 
substituting W. Germany for Germany. 
34 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 155. 
35 Powell, Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions, 233. 
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dominant party.”36 Whether caused by the growth of the voting population, more effective 
outside parties, or simply changed voter preferences, the established political leaders 
believed that changing electoral rules gave them the best chance to maintain power.37 
Reengineering the electoral system allowed incumbent parties to avoid total defeat without 
adapting their ideological preferences to become more representative of the voting 
population.38 
Much analysis shows that there are indeed important positive effects of plurality-
based elections, though these studies generally stop short of recommending it as a solution 
to the problems of partisan fragmentation in presidential systems. Shugart and Carey do 
desire a form of plurality, rather than majority-runoff, for presidential elections to 
encourage broad pre-election coalitions in presidential contests.39 Helmke too considers 
plurality-based elections instead of PR as one option to reduce fragmentation.40 But these 
authors balk at a solution that might produce a two-party outcome. Shugart and Carey, 
instead more concerned about increased representation in government, argue that “voters 
should have a large menu of partisan choices from which to select, in order that nearly 
every voter has a party close to his or her ideal policy point.”41 In their conclusion, these 
authors fix “a representative assembly elected by PR to ensure ‘fair’ representation of 
diversity,” as an essential key to a properly crafted presidential system. Helmke, even after 
declaring a need to narrow the gap between a president’s constitutional and partisan 
                                               
36 Laura Wills-Otero, “Electoral Systems in Latin America: Explaining the Adoption of Proportional 
Representation Systems During the Twentieth Century,” Latin American Politics and Society 51, no. 3 (Fall 
2009): 33, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2009.00055.x. 
37 Wills-Otero, “Electoral Systems in Latin America: Explaining the Adoption of Proportional 
Representation Systems During the Twentieth Century,” 37. 
38 Wills-Otero, 36. 
39 Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, 286. 
40 Helmke, Institutions on the Edge: The Origins and Consequences of Inter-Branch Crises in Latin 
America, 161. 
41 Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, 273. 
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powers, dismisses a move away from PR because she believes it would result in a 
legislature that represents fewer citizens.42 
Shugart and Carey may incorrectly assume that significant electoral fractures often 
resolve themselves post-election in presidential systems.43 Powell shows that, for his 
samples, post-election coalition formation results in a government more aligned with the 
median voter; but Valenzuela describes how, without requirements for post-election 
bargaining for executive formation, “legislators may ignore programmatic considerations 
entirely and seek instead to gain as many advantages as possible for specific constituency 
interests.”44 Rather than forcing a stable coalition based on programmatic compromises to 
ensure executive survival, coalitions in Latin America instead become, as Valenzuela 
notes, “short-lived and ad hoc, aimed at grabbing the main chance or weathering the crisis 
of the moment rather than representing a stable majority of legislators.”45  
Minority governments that try to survive without building a wider coalition may be 
equally troubled. Though Shugart and Carey contend that a government short of a majority 
can join with other minor parties to effectively govern, the common addition of a minority 
president may change these incentives. As Valenzuela notes, “Opposition parties will often 
stand to get no credit for successful policies but risk blame for failures, giving such parties 
scant reason to rally to the president.”46 O’Donnell observes that not only do opposition 
parties most often unite against the president but that it is common for the president to lose 
the support of his own party.47 
While electoral diversity provides voters with more voices to choose from, Latin 
American systems often do not translate that into a government that is more representative 
                                               
42 Helmke, Institutions on the Edge: The Origins and Consequences of Inter-Branch Crises in Latin 
America, 162. 
43 Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, 11. 
44 Valenzuela, “Latin American Presidencies Interrupted,” 13. 
45 Valenzuela, 13. 
46 Valenzuela, 13. 
47 O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” 61. 
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of the people. More commonly, the government is made up of a minority president (often 
provided what O’Donnell has described as the “myth” of legitimacy through a runoff)48 
and a highly fractured legislature. Without widely representative coalitions required to 
govern, it is not clear how more electoral choice provides for more representative 
government in Latin America.  
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
In contrast to the explanations outlined above, I argue that inter-branch conflict is 
less likely when a democracy provides systematic incentives to form widely-representative 
political coalitions, either among multiple parties or simply through the incorporation of 
broad political interests within a party. Parliamentary systems, through a requirement for a 
majority-endorsed executive, and plurality-presidential systems, through winner-take-all 
legislative elections, both naturally encourage broadly-representative political coalitions. 
However, a government produced by a system that combines PR elections and a president 
is neither institutionally nor electorally forced to produce such coalitions. Without these 
predetermined coalition incentives, stable, broadly-backed coalitions may be rare in combo 
PR-presidential regimes. The evidence from this thesis indicates that inter-branch conflict 
is made more likely in PR-presidential systems that are not shaped by coalition incentives 
similar to the ones inherent in parliamentary or plurality-presidential systems. 
In Latin America, institutional incentives do not drive broad coalition formation 
like they do in many other democracies. Electoral outcomes in the region often result in a 
president who, in the first round of elections, was supported by well short of a majority and 
a legislature without one party in control. However, as Anthony Downs contends, “every 
democratic government must somehow obtain the voluntary consent of a majority of voters 
before it can legitimately govern.”49 In a parliamentary system, this majority is produced 
through a legislative coalition that determines the composition of the executive, with new 
elections threatening if a consensus cannot be achieved. Elections decided by a single-
                                               
48 O’Donnell, 60. 
49 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, 142. 
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ballot, plurality rule force efforts at majority formation before elections, most often 
resulting in a two-party system.50 In Latin America’s multiparty presidential systems, 
scholars have described how fixed terms often have encouraged opposition rather than 
support post-election in order to form distinctions with the government. If coalitions are 
not institutionally incentivized they may never form, undermining the assumption of 
majority representation as a necessary (though not sufficient) requirement for democratic 
governance. 
Fragmentation that weakens partisan support for the president but strengthens his 
power relative to the legislature may be a result of the institutional incentives of the 
electoral system employed. The electoral incentives provided by PR-presidential systems 
avoid the requirement for pre- or post-election coalition formation that derives a majority 
consensus. Though Shugart and Haggard argue that constitutional designers intentionally 
gave executives particular law-making powers to accommodate for disunity in political 
systems,51 it can also be argued that the constitutional design itself promotes the disunity 
that encourages executive overreach into legislative matters. In Latin American political 
societies, presidents who are only supported by a minority nevertheless have gained an 
increasing ability to bypass legislatures to impose their policy objectives. Without a 
requirement for broad, passion-diluting coalitions to govern, the self-interested factions 
that U.S. constitutional designers warned of often get a chance to rule in Latin America, 
bringing confrontation rather than compromise to government.52 
1. Variation in Coalition Dynamics 
An ideal research plan would compare nations with histories and cultures similar 
in all aspects other than the institutional arrangement that produces either a parliamentary 
system, a plurality-presidential system, or a PR-presidential system. Despite these diverse 
                                               
50 Maurice Duverger, “The Number of Parties,” in Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, ed. 
Patrick H. O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2018), 432. 
51 Eduardo Alemán and George Tsebelis, “Political Parties and Government Coalitions in the Americas,” 
Journal of Politics in Latin America 3, no. 1 (January 2011): 12, http://search.proquest.com/docview/
876184109/. 
52 James Madison, “The Federalist No. 10,” in The Federalist Papers, ed. Ian Shapiro (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009). 
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outcomes globally, Latin America is dominated by presidential systems that incorporate 
PR elections for national legislatures. As already discussed, Latin American political 
systems, much less histories, are neither replications of Europe nor the United States (nor 
Africa and Asia for that matter), making a comparative analysis of systems across 
continents difficult. Though Latin America’s democracies adopted a PR system after 
democracy proliferated across the continent, comparing inter-branch conflicts from Latin 
America’s incomplete foundational democracies in the 1890s with the crises that 
accompanied the resurgence of democracy in the region during the 1980s also would lead 
to an analysis of countries in many ways more dissimilar than alike. However, though 
parliamentary and two-party coalition outcomes are not incentivized through a standard 
institutional arrangement in Latin America’s combined PR-presidential systems, they still 
are possible. The combination of PR and presidential systems just makes it much more 
likely for a broad governing coalition not to exist.  
The comparative study in Chapter Two classifies Latin America’s political 
coalitions into plurality, parliamentary, and alternate groupings. Plurality outcomes are 
further broken down into two subcategories to analyze the increased variation of two-party 
dominant systems in Latin America. A “Strong Plurality” group includes governments in 
which the two principal legislative parties and the two principal presidential candidates 
each receive more than 84 percent of the vote. These regimes most often have two parties 
that can each compete for independent control of the executive and legislative branches. A 
“Weak Plurality” group, in which the top two parties and candidates receive at least 75 
percent of the vote, is also considered. This system is still indicative of two dominant 
parties and presidents responsible to healthy pluralities, although independent majorities 
may be difficult to achieve. The “Parliamentary” category includes governments that form 
post-election majority coalitions through legislatively inclusive executive cabinets. Lastly, 
the “Alternate” design coalition, uniquely common to PR-presidential systems, 
encompasses all other coalition results that cannot be classified into the previous 
categories.  
Despite the uniform utilization of PR legislative elections in Latin America’s 
presidential systems, the historical experience has provided a healthy mix of regimes that 
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fall within each of these categories. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Venezuela, Costa 
Rica, and Colombia were effective two-party systems praised for being stable democratic 
governments.53 Post-election executive-branch cabinet coalitions similar to a 
parliamentary outcome also occur in Latin America, even without congressional 
requirements. Latin American presidents, such as Fernando Cardoso in Brazil and Julio 
María Sanguinetti in Uruguay, have governed over fractured congressional systems with 
executive cabinets derived from parties that together constituted a legislative majority. 
2. Effects of Variation 
The peculiar mixing of PR and presidentialism may encourage inherently unstable 
governments and increased inter-branch conflict. Shugart and Carey observe that four of 
the five longest-lived presidential systems as of 1991 (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
United States, and Venezuela) all have presidents that score low on legislative power.54 
However, all of these countries, including the omitted Colombia (in 1991), also had 
plurality based presidential elections that incentivized some pre-election coalition 
formation. Evidence from studying the inter-branch crises from both a broad group of Latin 
American countries during a common era, as well as a selection of individual cases over 
longer periods, can point to whether presidential strength, partisan support, or voter 
preference for authoritarian leadership is more commonly associated with inter-branch 
conflict, or rather if coalition formation outcomes are more important. 
Under presidential regimes, electorally independent branches may mean that 
effective coalitions can only be adequately guaranteed through pre-election coalitions best 
achieved through plurality-based elections. Rather than reducing representation by shifting 
away from PR systems, adopting plurality elections throughout Latin America may 
actually encourage a broader base of representation in the governing parties of both 
branches, making them more electorally secure, more moderate, and less prone to political 
attack. 
                                               
53 Gabriel L. Negretto, “Presidents and Democratic Performance in Latin America,” Latin American 
Politics and Society 48, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 65. 
54 Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, 158. 
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D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To shed light on the roots of inter-branch crises in Latin America, this study begins 
by examining the correlation of each coalition type to political crisis, focusing on the era 
defined by the third wave of democratization. High-frequency inter-branch conflict and the 
premature termination of constitutionally defined electoral terms both indicate political 
crisis. Valenzuela, Helmke, and Gabriel Negretto all have accumulated robust data sets of 
inter-branch conflicts and interrupted presidencies at the end of the 20th century. The 
expected result is that coalitions that best mimic either a plurality or a parliamentary system 
are significantly less prone to inter-branch conflict and democratic breakdown than those 
of an “alternate” design. 
The thesis will then turn to the case studies of Chile and Venezuela to evaluate the 
causal linkages between coalition patterns and political outcomes. In Latin America, a lack 
of institutional incentives for coalition building means that coalition types can be 
ephemeral. Without electoral requirements, coalitions are more susceptible to breakdown. 
According to the theory advanced in this thesis, coalition breakdown is often attached to 
crisis. However, it may not be immediately clear if this coalition breakdown leads to crisis 
or rather is caused by it. These case studies help uncover the details of inter-branch conflict 
and the various contributing forces that lead up to a political crisis. This more detailed 
analysis sheds light on whether coalition forces were a driving factor to crisis, or whether 
presidential strength, a dearth of partisan support, or a Latin American cultural proclivity 
for an authoritarian leader were stronger contributors. The goal of these studies is not to 
explain the particular crises that led to democratic collapse. Rather the goal is to explain 
the conditions that made it harder to resolve these crises within the established democratic 
framework. 
Due to the varied nature of Latin American nations, histories, and constitutions, the 
best way to control for the multitude of factors that can contribute to any one crisis is by 
analyzing individual countries with varied stability outcomes over time. In particular, 
countries that had been stable for an extended period before significant inter-branch crisis 
might suggest an immunity that was lost independent of general external shocks. Both 
Venezuela (with a relatively weak president) in the 1980s, and Chile (with a relatively 
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strong president) in the 1960s, represented democracies that were arguably consolidated, 
with strong democratic traditions and entrenched respect for democratic institutions. The 
precipitous and shocking unraveling of their democracies coincided with the collapse of 
inter-party cooperation, offering important clues as to whether crisis or coalition 
breakdown occurred first. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The next chapter presents the comparative analysis of Latin American democracies 
from 1978–2002. It begins by discussing the expected results of the study, advancing a 
theoretical framework that explains why a two-party result may be most conducive to both 
stability and popular representation in presidential systems. It then reviews the results from 
the analysis which, as expected, shows that plurality and parliamentary regimes have lower 
levels of inter-branch conflict and fewer interrupted regimes than those of the “alternate” 
design. The chapter concludes that broadly inclusive two-party systems are the most likely 
to sustain healthy presidential democracies.  
Chapter III analyzes the presidential system in Chile under the 1925 constitution. 
This system balanced a fragmented legislature with a president through a distinct 
separation of responsibility that allowed plurality electoral incentives to dominate national 
political expression. However, electoral and constitutional reform gradually nationalized 
the congress, bringing the divisions common in the PR-determined assembly to presidential 
races. The result was an increase in inter-branch conflict as coalitions became more 
ideologically rigid and as presidents could win office with narrower popular appeals. 
Chapter IV turns to Venezuela to assess political coalitions throughout its 
democratic period under the 1961 constitution. The harsh lessons from the nation’s initial 
failings with democracy were sufficient to ensure elite partisan compromise and post-
election coalitions to protect the democratic regime through its transition from military 
rule. However, once that transition was assured, presidential incentives took over and post-
electoral coalitions broke down, taking the consensual multiparty system with it. The raised 
stakes of presidential elections, along with their plurality nature and concurrent legislative 
elections, subsequently encouraged the dominance of two parties in 1973. However, the 
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PR system did not require these parties to compete for majority support to protect their 
dominant positions. The subsequent alternation in leadership of two major parties each 
unable to produce an electoral majority created a representation crisis that threatened the 
democratic regime, forcing a reversion to a multiparty system in 1993 (though one still 
without the post-election coalition incentives that built consensus during the country’s 
democratic transition). 
Chapter V draws on conclusions from the research and discusses general lessons 
learned from Latin America’s experiences with presidential democracy. 
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II. INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES IN LATIN AMERICA: 
SUCCESS AND FAILURE DURING DEMOCRACY’S THIRD WAVE 
Although all Latin American presidential systems select assemblies using PR 
elections that favor multiple parties, some electoral outcomes reflect a two-party result 
common to plurality-presidential systems while others see post-election coalitions, similar 
to those produced in parliamentary governments, built by the president in his or her cabinet. 
By further categorizing Latin American governments based on whether they reflect 
plurality-presidential outcomes, parliamentary outcomes, or instead remain uniquely 
identifiable as multiparty presidential systems, we can gain a better understanding of the 
implications of multiparty constitutional designs on the stability of presidential 
democracies. Using Latin American electoral results and post-election coalition data, this 
chapter will sort democratic administrations from 1978–2002 into Plurality (Strong and 
Weak), Parliamentary, or Alternate groups and analyze the propensity for political conflict 
within each category. The chapter will begin, though, by providing a theoretical framework 
that will lay out the expectation that governments are more stable when broad coalitions 
are deliberately built, either by pre- or post-electoral arrangement. It will also explain how 
plurality- and parliamentary-style presidential governments institutionalize such broad 
coalitions while more traditional multiparty presidential governments do not. As the data 
will show, Latin America’s democracies are indeed more prone to constitutional crisis and 
inter-branch conflict when their systems most closely reflect the multiparty presidential 
outcomes that their constitutional designs encourage. 
A. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND COALITIONS IN PRESIDENTIAL 
SYSTEMS 
The expectation that majority coalitions are requisite for stable democracies is not 
new. Arturo Valenzuela claims that “the need for a solid capacity to practice the ‘politics 
of addition’ and build governing coalitions becomes especially apparent when one realizes 
how many failed Latin presidents have been bereft of prima facie majority support.”55 
                                               
55 Valenzuela, “Latin American Presidencies Interrupted,” 13. 
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Valenzuela and others argue that Latin America’s fragmented body politic can only 
produce consistent majority coalitions by adopting parliamentary systems “where the 
country’s future is not at the mercy of a president who was either elected for a fixed term 
without a majority mandate or who has lost a majority mandate.”56 G. Bingham Powell, 
who argues that PR systems better represent a diverse constituency by electorally 
rewarding multiple parties, does so under the assumption that distinct political groups will 
then be reconciled in “an arena of shifting policy coalitions,” in which a majority of elected 
officials resolve their differences to form a compromise government.57 
As many advocates of parliamentary democracies point out, however, presidential 
systems inhibit the bargaining that promotes broad coalitions. Valenzuela describes that 
presidents are not only empowered by an individual electoral mandate that makes them 
reluctant to cede power to legislative competitors, but outside parties also have little to gain 
by joining a coalition that supports policies for which the president alone will receive 
credit.58 Juan Linz notes the “exceptional” and “unsatisfactory” nature of multiparty 
coalitions in presidential governments and warns of presidentialism as a system that can 
leave “more the 60 percent of voters without representation.” since no institutionalized 
mechanism ensures the brokering of a majority coalition.59 Too often for these authors, 
presidents come to hold a nation’s highest office without the popular backing of a 
democratic majority. 
However, just because broad coalitions are not mandated through a specific 
institutional design does not mean that Latin American governments will not produce them. 
As the data will show, Latin American presidents do at times look to use their cabinet 
positions to build legislative alliances that can facilitate the implementation of their 
                                               
56 Arturo Valenzuela, “Chile: Origins, Consolidation, and Breakdown of a Democratic Regime,” in 
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political agenda. Additionally, as Marisa Kellam observes, pre-electoral coalitions are 
actually commonly formed during Latin American presidential elections. In studying over 
77 elections, she finds that more than one in three presidential candidates able to gain above 
10 percent of the vote (in the first or only round) were part of a coalition, and that nearly 
half of the winning candidates came from coalitions.60  
However, there are often limits to the binding power of the pre- and post-electoral 
coalitions commonly seen in Latin America’s presidential systems. Although presidents 
may build legislatively representative cabinets similar to what is required of prime 
ministers, an individual electoral mandate and a fixed term provide presidents an 
independence from the assembly not shared by parliamentary heads of government. 
Additionally, the common use of presidential runoffs throughout the region actually causes 
most pre-electoral coalitions observed by Kellam to remain too narrow to produce first-
round majorities. Though a second-round runoff guarantees the victor over 50 percent of 
the vote, it does not reflect a real coalition of parties or even the true support of the 
majority.61 Rather, a second-round election may simply force voters to choose between 
two candidates they were initially opposed to, creating a victor who may not again be able 
to achieve a majority backing any time after election day.62 
Defenders of presidential systems generally acknowledge these shortcomings and 
argue for institutional arrangements that can help to address them. As described in Chapter 
I, Shugart and Carey desire plurality-based presidential elections that encourage presidents 
to broaden their platforms to gain wider bases of popular support.63 Gretchen Helmke and 
Scott Mainwaring contend that presidents need to be able to win broad legislative support 
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to prevent political conflict,64 and Mark Jones argues that, in presidential regimes, a 
“system with two major parties is desirable” in order to avoid partisan deficits in the 
assembly that are too great for presidents to overcome.65 However, these authors also 
advocate for a moderate level of multipartism in the legislature to ensure what they 
consider to be a more accurate representation of political interests in elected office. 
Even those who acknowledge the dangers of fractured legislatures in presidential 
systems nevertheless reject the adoption of plurality legislative elections to complement 
winner-take-all presidents.66 Jones, an advocate for presidential systems that favor the 
development of two main parties, nevertheless argues against single-member plurality 
districts (SMPDs) that are known to favor a two-party result. Jones worries that SMPDs 
lead to the marginalization of the second most popular party, the exclusion of smaller 
parties from government, the increase in gerrymandering, and a decrease in partisan unity 
due to an increased tendency for members of congress to “represent the interests of their 
district at the expense of those of the president/party.”67  
B. RETHINKING THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM 
The conception that a two-party system provides for less representation in 
presidential systems than a PR system misunderstands the nature of these alternative 
designs. A central insight from Kellam’s findings is that pre-electoral coalitions do not 
require parties to abandon their positions, but rather are formed with the intent of advancing 
their particular agendas.68 Although cabinet positions and other governmental spoils are 
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effective bargaining tools after elections, pre-electoral coalitions form because, according 
to Kellam, “parties can identify and support presidential candidates who are willing to 
compromise on policy and, if elected, would be most likely to pursue a policy agenda that 
they find favorable.”69 While parties within a pre-electoral coalition can maintain separate 
identities, such coalitions may also encourage parties to merge and form a larger and more 
internally diverse political organization under a common banner.70 
Although Duverger points out that electoral arrangements which promote two-party 
outcomes severely limit third-party competition, this does not mean that two-party systems 
ignore the policy preferences of substantial segments of the electorate. Because of the 
electoral incentives provided by winner-take-all districts, the parties are encouraged to 
incorporate rather than ignore outlying constituencies. As Downs describes, “since the only 
way to ensure a plurality against all opponents is to win a majority of votes, small parties 
tend to combine until two giants are left, each of which has a reasonable chance of 
capturing a majority in any given election.”71 Rather than viewing a two-party system as 
one in which two parties dominate at the expense of alternate ideological positions, a more 
accurate description is that two-party systems require the internal balance of many policy 
positions in a single party (policy positions that would otherwise be expressed by multiple 
parties in a PR system) to maximize electoral success. The incentives of plurality systems 
encourage political bargaining not unlike what one would expect to see in a PR 
parliamentary system, only the electorate votes on the end result of the bargaining process, 
not just the inputs into the system. 
The question remains whether plurality incentives actually force the major parties 
in two-party systems to represent various policy interests or if they can simply race toward 
the center, taking for granted all other policy preferences behind them. Some claim that, in 
a two-party system, the competition for the median vote eventually makes the parties 
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indistinguishable from one another. However, Downs shows that this assumption does not 
necessarily hold. “In a two-party system,” he writes, “if either party moves away from the 
extreme nearest it toward the other party, extremist voters at its end of the scale may abstain 
because they see no significant difference between the choices offered them.”72 In reality 
voters may abstain or vote in protest for a third-party candidate if either party moves too 
close or too far away from a voter’s acceptable policy position, potentially swinging the 
high-stakes, winner-take-all elections to the opposing party. Because oppositions in two-
party systems coalesce and victorious parties cannot rely on low-mandate pluralities, this 
actually provides significant leverage to each coherent faction within a party.73 If, despite 
the electoral incentives, a major party continually fails to adapt to the policy preferences 
of the voters, it will eventually be overtaken by a new party that can more successfully 
build a broad coalition.74 Winner-take-all incentives continually require major parties to 
adjust in hopes of reflecting the policy preferences of a majority of the electorate or 
otherwise risk falling to insignificance.75 
Although broad pre-electoral coalitions dilute the policy preferences available to 
voters, this, as Downs describes, is no different than what happens when a majority 
government is formed in a parliamentary system. If a particular set of policy preferences 
alone are insufficient to produce electoral majorities, a majority government must, as 
Downs describes, “mix various policies from a variety of viewpoints, espousing many 
philosophic outlooks imperfectly rather than any one perfectly.”76 The common need to 
form a coalition to garner the indirect support of a majority forces multiparty parliamentary 
systems to mesh policies of an array of parties into the government, leading to a policy-set 
that is actually “less definite and less well-integrated than those of the government in a 
two-party system.”77 
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While a requirement for a majority consensus forces most democracies to integrate 
a wider, though less cohesive, set of policies into the government, this is not always the 
case in Latin American democracies. Unencumbered by the need to win a plurality and 
with the impediments to post-election compromise described by Linz and Valenzuela, 
Latin American presidents often govern unconstrained by broad coalitions. Latin 
America’s multiparty systems, rather than integrating definite policy-sets into a 
compromise government, often instead promote the winner-take-all outcome that Jones 
worries about, only without requiring a diverse base of support. When it comes to who 
does the governing, not only can such an outcome underrepresent one losing party (like is 
seen in plurality-presidential systems), it can shut out of the government many losing 
parties and, along with them, the voting preferences of the majority of the electorate. 
C. EXPECTATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES 
Based on these insights, I expect Latin American democracies to be more stable 
when broad coalitions are built to form a government actually representative of a majority 
interest. Rather than what many advocates of plurality systems would contend, I expect 
Strong Plurality outcomes, where the top two parties and presidential candidates dominate 
the electoral space, to be as stable if not more so than those in which plurality incentives 
either affect only presidential contests or otherwise leave more space for smaller parties to 
compete in the legislative arena. Countries that have multiparty dominant competitions in 
their presidential elections, legislative elections, or both (without successfully building a 
majority post-election coalition in the executive cabinet) are expected to perform poorly. 
This study is limited to governments produced through competitive democratic 
processes. It requires elections, in line with Robert Dahl’s description, to be frequent and 
fairly conducted, with coercion comparatively uncommon.78 This requirement forces the 
exclusion of both Mexico, which produced a system dominated by a single-party for 71 
                                               
78 Phillip C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy is…and is not,” in Essential Readings 
in Comparative Politics, ed. Patrick H. O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
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years, and Paraguay, which maintained its own one-party rule for 61 years, as data points 
during the period studied. 
Additionally, it is acknowledged that the “plurality” and “parliamentary” 
descriptors of Latin America’s PR-presidential systems really only represent 
approximations of a true form of such systems. For example, even with the significant 
dominance of two parties in some Latin American systems, it is extremely rare for there to 
be no third-party representation in Latin American congressional houses. Additionally, the 
use of post-election cabinet coalitions to determine effective legislative support requires 
the assumption that political parties will align with the president simply through the 
inclusion of a representative of that party in his or her cabinet. In true parliamentary 
regimes, this alliance is brokered in the assembly and may be undone if the party loses 
confidence in the executive; in presidential systems, the cabinet arrangement is most often 
exclusively subject to the discretion of the president and thus may not form as binding a 
tie to the legislative contingent.  
Despite these limitations, these regime-type approximations can provide insight 
into what institutional designs are more successful in Latin America’s democracies. If 
presidential systems operate more efficiently with plurality incentives, than they should 
become more stable when two-party outcomes are stronger. If presidential systems require 
a multi-party consensus, then those presidents that build inclusive cabinets should be 
relatively successful. If democratic stability in Latin America is independent of the 
multiparty nature of its governments, we should see no adverse effects when multiparty 
outcomes are most dominant. 
D. DATA AND RESULTS 
This chapter analyzes democratic stability, as measured through inter-branch 
conflict and early terminations of presidential systems, during the third wave of 
democratization in Latin America. Using data from 1978 to 2002, Latin American regimes 
are classified according to the outlined criteria: those that approximate a plurality model 
(subcategorized into Strong and Weak Plurality outcomes to better analyze current 
academic debate), those that approximate the post-election consensus of a PR-
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parliamentary model, and those that are dominated by multiparty outcomes without such 
post-election partisan accommodations. “Strong Plurality” results are seen when the top 
two presidential candidates and the top two parties competing in legislative elections 
(lower or single house) each receive more than 84 percent of the vote, in line with the 
definition of plurality from Shugart and Carey.79 A “Weak Plurality” category, where top-
two results for president and legislative elections are at least 75 percent, allows an analysis 
of a system with two major parties but which maintains more room for minor parties to 
independently influence governance. A “Parliamentary” category is formed by 
governments in which executive cabinets are built to incorporate a mix of parties that 
together represent a legislative majority. Lastly, an “Alternate” design category is built 
from systems where the top-two results are under 75 percent for either presidential or 
legislative contests and where there are no parliamentary-style majority cabinet coalitions. 
The comparative analysis done in this chapter draws from data produced by Gabriel 
Negretto for his study on minority governance in Latin America. Negretto compiles an 
index of executive-legislative conflict from information in the Latin American Weekly 
Report that provides an informative dependent variable for the purposes of this chapter. 
This index reflects the frequency of executive-legislative conflict based on the ratio of 
articles reporting conflict to those with politics as a main or secondary theme.80 While 
Negretto’s index includes the type of legislative-executive conflict typical of healthy 
democratic processes, such as congressional rejection of presidential proposals or 
presidential vetoes, it also includes reports of more severe conflicts such as censures and 
impeachments.81 The expectation that reports of these types of conflict would become 
more common the further they deviate from normal practices is supported by the high 
conflict index associated with early termination of presidential regimes, a separate measure 
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of political conflict complied by Valenzuela (and also utilized by Negretto). Early 
terminations are defined as “when presidents were ousted from office after a successful 
impeachment process; when they decided to dissolve the congress, either legally or 
illegally; when they were forced to resign after mass protests against the government; or 
when the government was overthrown by a military coup.”82 Overall, there are 13 early 
terminations of regimes in this data set, described further in Table 2. Electoral results are 
drawn from Dieter Nohlen’s thorough catalog of elections in the Americas, while post-
election coalition data is again drawn from Negretto. 
Table 1. Coalition Types and Levels of Conflict in Latin American 
Democracies, 1978–2002.83 
STRONG PLURALITY SYSTEMS 
>84% results for top two parties/candidates in both lower/single congressional house and presidential races 
Country President  Term  Freq. of Conflict (%) Early Term. 
Chile  Aylwin*   1989–1994 9.8 
 
Colombia Turbay   1978–1982 3.5 
  Betancur^  1982–1986 4.6 
  Barco   1986–1990 2.9 
 
Costa Rica Monge   1982–1986 4.0 
  Arias   1986–1990 0.0 
  Calderón  1990–1994 0.0 
  Figueres   1994–1998 0.0 
 
Honduras Suazo Córdoba  1982–1986 8.6 
  Azcona   1986–1990 11.9 
  Callejas   1990–1994 3.3 
  Reina   1994–1998 0.0 
  Flores   1998–2002 0.0 
 
Nicaragua Barrios   1990–1996 29.3 
                     Avg.       
Countries Governments       Conflict Frequency  Early Term. 
5  14     5.6%   0 (0%) 
* Multi-party coalition 
^ Combined Plurality/Post-election coalition 
Table cont’d on next page 
                                               
82 Negretto, 78. 
83 Adapted from Negretto, “Presidents and Democratic Performance in Latin America,” 63–92; Dieter 
Nohlen, Elections in the Americas: Volume 1 North America, Central America, and the Caribbean (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Dieter Nohlen, Elections in the Americas: Volume 2 South America 
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Table cont’d from previous page 
WEAK PLURALITY SYSTEMS 
>75% results for top two parties/candidates in both lower/single congressional house and presidential races, 
but not a Strong Plurality system 
Country President  Term  Freq. of Conflict (%) Early Term. 
Argentina Alfonsín+  1983–1989 4.9   Yes 
De la Rúa  1999–2001 12.2   Yes 
 
Chile  Frei*   1994–2000 8.1 
 
Costa Rica Carazo   1978–1982 7.3 
  Rodríguez  1998–2002 0.0 
 
Dom. Rep. Balaguer I  1986–1990 0.0 
  Balaguer III  1994–1996 0.0   Yes 
  Fernández Reyna^ 1996–2000  0.0  
 
El Salvador Cristiani   1989–1991 0.0 
 
Nicaragua Alemán   1997–2002 0.0 
 
Uruguay  Sanguinetti I  1984–1989 13.2 
 
Venezuela Herrera Campíns  1978–1983 14.1 
  Lusinchi   1983–1988 9.0 
                     Avg.       
Countries Governments       Conflict Frequency  Early Term. 
8  13     5.3%   3 (23%) 
* Multi-party coalition 
+ Strong Plurality from 1983–1985; Weak Plurality from 1985–1989 
^Combined Plurality/Post-election coalition 
 
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS 
Executive Cabinet Representative of a Legislative Majority 
Country President  Term  Freq. of Conflict (%) Early Term. 
Bolivia  Paz Zamora  1989–1993 11.8 
  Sán. de Lozada I  1993–1997 7.1 
  Bánzer   1997–2001 0.0 
  Sán. de Lozada II  2002–2003 21.0   Yes 
 
Brazil  Cardoso I  1994–1998 12.3 
  Cardoso II  1998–2002 6.2 
 
Colombia Betancur^  1982–1986 4.6 
 
Dom. Rep. Fernández Reyna^ 1996–1998 0.0 
 
Peru  Belaúnde  1980–1985 10.5 
 
Uruguay  Lacalle   1989–1994 20.5 
  Sanguinetti II  1994–1999 0.0 
                     Avg.       
Countries Governments       Conflict Frequency  Early Term. 
5  11     8.5%   1 (9%) 
^Combined Plurality/Post-election coalition 
Table cont’d on next page 
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Table cont’d from previous page 
ALTERNATE SYSTEMS 
Regimes with <75% for either one of top-two candidates for president/parties in congress and without post-
election majority coalition in the executive cabinet 
Country President  Term  Freq. of Conflict (%) Early Term. 
Argentina Menem I  1989–1995 8.9 
  Menem II  1995–1999 9.1 
 
Bolivia  Siles Zuazo  1982–1985 16.7   Yes 
  Paz Estenssoro  1985–1989 20.5 
 
Brazil  Collor de Mello  1990–1992 20.7   Yes 
 
Colombia Gaviria   1990–1994 6.8 
  Samper   1994–1998 6.7 
  Pastrana   1998–2002 3.4 
 
Dom. Rep. Balaguer II  1990–1994 0.0 
 
Ecuador  Roldós~   1979–1981 34.8 
  Febres Cordero  1984–1988 26.6 
  Borja   1988–1992 28.8 
  Durán Ballén  1992–1996 24.2 
  Bucaram  1996–1997 23.1   Yes 
  Mahuad   1998–2002 7.8   Yes 
 
El Salvador Duarte   1985–1989 5.6 
  Cristiani   1991–1994 0.0 
  Calderón  1994–1999 0.0 
 
Guatemala Cerezo   1986–1991 12.0 
  Serrano   1991–1993 10.0   Yes 
  Arzú   1995–1999 0.0 
 
Panama  Pérez Balladares  1994–1999 0.0 
 
Peru  García   1985–1990 15.3 
  Fujimori I  1990–1992 21.1   Yes 
  Fujimori II  1995–2000 4.2 
  Fujimori III  2000–2000 25.0   Yes 
 
Venezuela Pérez   1988–1993 25.3   Yes 
  Caldera   1994–1999 10.3   
  Chávez   1998–2000 19.4   Yes 
                     Avg.       
Countries Governments       Conflict Frequency  Early Term. 
11  29     13.3%   9 (31%) 
~ Died in office 
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Raúl Alfonsín (Argentina, 1983–89): Resigned five months before scheduled end of term. 
Economic crisis, mass street demonstrations, unable to implement policies that were being 
criticized by the president-elect. 
Elected: 48.8–39.1 
Congressional vote: 38.6–42.9 
Replaced by: Elected successor. 
 
Fernando De la Rúa (Argentina, 1999–2001): Resigned two years into a four-year term. 
Economic crisis, violent demonstrations, allegations of corruption. Vice-president had 
resigned. 
Elected: 48.4–38.7 
Congressional vote: 43.8–35.9 
Replaced by: A series of congressional appointees. 
 
Joaquín Balaguer (Dominican Republic, 1994–96): Resigned after allegations of electoral 
fraud undercut the legitimacy of his narrowly won third-term. Massive popular 
demonstrations. Constitutional changes reduced his term in office by two years. 
Elected: 42.3–41.6 
Congressional vote: 39.1–41.9 








 Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (Bolivia, 2002–03): Resigned one year into his second (non-
consecutive) four-year term. Massive street demonstrations. Majority coalition disintegrated.  
Elected: 22.5–20.9 
Congressional vote: 22.5–20.9 











Hernán Siles Zuazo (Bolivia, 1982–85): Resigned three years into a four-year term in 
accordance with a church-brokered agreement. Economic crisis, hyperinflation, street 
demonstrations, allegations of corruption. 
Elected: 38.7–20.2 
Congressional vote: 38.7–20.2 
Replaced by: Elected successor. 
 
Fernando Collor de Mello (Brazil, 1990–92): Resigned two years into a four-year term. 
Economic crisis, street demonstrations, allegations of corruption. Impeached. 
Elected: 30.5–17.2 (First round) 
Congressional vote: 19.3–12.4 
Replaced by: Vice-president. 
 
Table cont’d on next page 
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Abdalá Bucaram (Ecuador, 1996–97): Resigned six months into a four-year term. Economic 
crisis, allegations of corruption. Charged with “mental incapacity” by the congress. 
Elected: 26.3–27.3 (First round) 
Congressional vote: 20.4–30.4 
Replaced by: Congressional appointee; vice-president bypassed. 
 
Jamil Mahuad (Ecuador, 1998–2000): Resigned two years into a four-year term. Allegations 
of corruption, massive protests by indigenous groups, military split in support over austerity 
policies. 
Elected: 34.9–26.6 (First round) 
Congressional vote: 23.8–19.0 
Replaced by: Vice-president. 
 
Jorge Serrano (Guatemala, 1991–93): Resigned two years into a five-year term after an 
attempt to close the congress and arrest members of the Supreme Court. Economic crisis led 
to confrontation with the legislature.  
Elected: 24.1–25.7 (First round) 
Congressional vote: 24.1–25.7 
Replaced by: Congressional appointee; vice-president resigned. 
 
Alberto Fujimori (Peru, 1990–95): Dismissed congress in an autogolpe in 1992. Strong 
popular support and support from the military. 
Elected: 29.1–32.6 (First round) 
Congressional vote: 16.5–30.1–25.0 (president’s party in third) 
Replaced by: President called for new elections for constitutional assembly. 
 
Alberto Fujimori (Peru, 2000): Resigned at the beginning of a constitutionally questionable 
third-term. Contested election, allegations of corruption, scandal with intelligence chief, 
street demonstrations. 
Elected: 49.9–40.2 (First round) 
Congressional vote: 42.2–23.2 
Replaced by: Congressional appointee; first vice-president resigned, second vice-president 
bypassed. 
 
Carlos Andrés Pérez (Venezuela, 1989–93): Impeached and removed from office at the end 
of his second presidency (non-consecutive). Economic crisis, attempted military coups, 
allegations of corruption.  
Elected: 52.9–40.4 
Congressional vote: 43.3–31.1 
Replaced by: Congressional appointee. 
 
Hugo Chávez (Venezuela, 1998–2000): Constituent assembly elected with 94 percent 
partisan support for the president. Congress dismantled, judges disbarred; assembly 
threatened to unseat local government officials before international outcry. New constitution 
written. 
Elected: 56.2–40.0 
Congressional vote: 19.9-24.1 
Replaced by: President called for elections in 2000 for president and new unicameral National 
Assembly. 
 
Elected data (%) indicates top-two candidate electoral results from first- or only-round presidential elections; 
president’s electoral percentage first. Congressional vote data (%) indicates top-two party electoral results in the 
lower or only chamber of congress; president’s party listed first. 
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Although the interrupted governments in Latin America during the third wave of 
democratization were often not breakdowns of democratic system, these events 
nevertheless are still very concerning. Interruptions of governments signal unhealthy 
democracy, even if legally accomplished and when removing clearly corrupt presidents. 
As Helmke describes, impeachment and other similar checks and balances “are designed 
primarily to serve as a deterrent. Thus, even if presidents who committed misdeeds are 
appropriately removed from office, we should still be concerned that institutions are failing 
ex ante, at least in this basic sense.”85 Moreover, quite often the remedy to political crisis 
in these cases is far from politically neutral. Many instances of early interruption conclude 
with outcomes that bypass standard methods of succession and instead change the partisan 
balance—impeached presidents are replaced by their political rivals instead of their vice-
presidents, opposition congresses are disbanded before the end of their terms and 
reconstituted with members more amendable to the president.86 Partisan payoffs encourage 
politicians to drum up allegations of corruption against their political opponents or claim 
that individual leaders or branches of government are exclusively culpable for economic 
crises. The extra-electoral tools provided to check amoral or illegal actions are often used 
as referenda on an opponent’s political performance and political allegiances instead. 
Furthermore, these inter-branch attacks also serve to undermine the legitimacy of 
established procedures and reduce popular attachment to established democratic 
institutions. Almost always, interruptions during this period were accompanied by 
widespread popular protest and a breakdown of the popular faith in a country’s democratic 
institutions. 
The data presented in the above tables show distinct trends among the governments 
of each regime classification. Countries that met the criteria to be classified as Strong 
Plurality systems reported well-below average levels of inter-branch conflict (5.6 percent) 
and had no early terminations of their governments. The frequency of inter-branch conflict 
was in the single-digits for almost all regimes of this type, which included 14 separate 
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governments among five nations. The two exceptions to this were the Azcona government 
in Honduras, at 11.9 percent, and an outlier in the Barrios administration, reopening 
democracy in Nicaragua after over a decade of Sandinista rule, which alone brought the 
group average up over two points.  
At just 5.3 percent, the Weak Plurality grouping (which included thirteen 
governments from eight countries) had a similar average frequency of executive-legislative 
conflict as the Strong Plurality group, but also had three early terminations of governments. 
Although no single country from this group had a frequency of conflict over 14.1 percent, 
three governments had reported levels in double digits (of which only one accounted for 
an early termination in this group). Parliamentary-type regimes reported inter-branch 
conflict in 8.5 percent of political articles and had one early termination of government. 
Double-digit levels of inter-branch conflict were observed in 5 of the 11 governments that 
made up this category, with two reporting levels above 20 percent. As expected, the most 
common regime type in Latin America during this period was the Alternate design system, 
which described 29 of 67 governments (43 percent of the total) and was seen in 11 
countries. Also as expected, this group had the highest levels of reported conflict, 
averaging in the double-digits at 13.3 percent, and governments in this group failed to 
fulfill their elected terms nearly one-third of the time (in nine of twenty-nine governments). 
The single-country strings that appear in each category are not surprising, as 
coalitions are often systematically encouraged—a nation’s established political 
arrangements should promote common coalition outcomes, even if not as rigidly as true 
plurality-presidential or parliamentary systems. The variation in the strength and type of 
coalitions produced within countries that is observed, however, suggests that institutional 
mechanisms rather than political culture play the dominant role in their shape. Plurality-
type coalitions in Colombia became less common after 1991 constitutional reform made 
presidential elections decided by majority runoff rather than plurality. Constitutional 
reform in Argentina in 1994 produced similar results, although fewer governments from 
Argentina are included in this analysis. However, individual case studies, like the ones in 
the chapters that follow, will allow a more detailed analysis of the effects that institutional 
arrangements have on coalition formation. 
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The single-country variations observed in this data-set also further support this 
thesis. Although reported levels of inter-branch conflict are relatively low in Colombia, the 
frequency of conflict among its three Strong Plurality governments is nearly 40 percent 
less than what is produced when its administrations instead fall into the Alternate design 
category. Costa Rica’s Strong Plurality governments outperform its Weak Plurality 
governments; Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru’s Parliamentary governments, and Venezuela’s 
Weak Plurality governments, all also average lower levels of inter-branch conflict than 
when they otherwise produce an Alternate design. Even a same president in Uruguay’s 
Julio María Sanguinetti presided over significantly less inter-branch conflict when he built 
a multiparty cabinet coalition than when his regime barely made the cut as a Weak Plurality 
system. Of all the cases assessed, there are zero nations that on average have less inter-
branch conflict with their Alternate regimes than with their Strong Plurality or 
Parliamentary counterparts. 
Although some countries have higher general levels of conflict than others, 
variation of unrelated endogenous factors can partly be controlled for with the diverse 
regional sampling provided in this data-set. In assessing the mean level of conflict, outliers 
on either end of reported stability can mostly cancel each other out; El Salvador and the 
Dominican Republic weigh against Ecuador in the Alternate grouping, Nicaragua weighs 
against Costa Rica in the Strong Plurality group. Moreover, some of these extreme 
measurements may indeed be system induced. Perhaps Ecuador’s high levels of inter-
branch conflict should not be surprising from a system that produced presidents and leading 
legislative parties that each frequently struggled to win 30 percent of the vote (and that did 
not form post-electoral coalitions to make up the difference). 
The evidence from above suggests that presidential systems in Latin America 
supported by broad coalitions are less prone to inter-branch conflict and interrupted 
presidencies than those that are not. As hypothesized, the multiparty dominant presidential 
systems of the Alternate regime type are the most likely to be unstable and lead to early 
regime terminations; these systems are twice as likely to have reports of inter-branch 
conflict (13.3 percent compared to 6.4 percent for all other regimes during this period) and 
their governments are three times as likely not to survive to the end of their appointed term.  
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The difference in the reported inter-branch conflict between Strong and Weak 
Plurality systems is negligible. However, there does appear to be an increased chance of 
early termination as the two-party influence weakens. Additionally, the level of reported 
inter-branch conflict does increase substantially as the electoral percentage of the top two-
parties/candidates drops closer to 75 percent, with the frequency of executive-legislative 
conflict growing to 9.7 percent for those five governments with top-two results under an 
80 percent threshold. This evidence calls into question the assumption that some levels of 
PR are obviously healthier for presidential systems and suggests that engineering a system 
with exactly the right amount of multiparty expression may be a risky gamble. This also 
offers insight into the popular acceptability of two-way electoral choices. Despite the 
suggested lack of representativeness of two-party systems, each of the regimes in the 
Strong Plurality category survived to the end of their elected terms; popular protests that 
demanded presidential resignations only took place in systems with heavier multiparty 
influences. 
The data also indicate that presidents that build post-election coalitions reduce the 
levels of inter-branch conflict and increase the odds that the regime will survive intact until 
the end of the term. However, the results for this regime type do not indicate post-electoral 
compromise is better at increasing stability in presidencies than a system that encourages 
two-party results. Instead, the reported level of inter-branch conflict is on average higher 
for “Parliamentary” systems than those of the plurality categories, while the percentage of 
early terminations is greater than that of the “Strong Plurality” grouping and nearly exactly 
the same as is found in a combination of the plurality categories (11 percent–9 percent). 
Another insight from this data is that Strong Plurality outcomes not only are very 
likely to produce majority legislatures for presidents (a “unified government”), providing 
the partisan support argued for by Mainwaring and Helmke, but they may be even less 
prone to inter-branch conflict than unified majority regimes in general. Of the 66 
governments analyzed during this period, only eight (12 percent) were unified without a 
two-party influence. On the other hand, of the 14 regimes in the Strong Plurality group, 
only three were not unified governments; the outliers, Colombia in 1982–1986 and 1986–
1990, and Costa Rica in 1994–1998, nevertheless were regimes with well-below average 
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levels of reported conflict. Moreover, while unified governments avoided early 
terminations, their levels of reported conflict were not better than the plurality groupings 
(with reports of inter-branch conflict for non-plurality unified governments higher than the 
plurality average, at 8.1 percent). The observed relative increase of inter-branch conflict in 
multiparty governments that nevertheless provide their presidents a single-party majority 
is interesting. It suggests that, while higher partisan support reduces the level of inter-
branch conflict, a presidential system is nevertheless healthier when the majority 
government also must contend with a unified and electorally threatening opposition.  
Table 3. Efficient Presidential Elections Without Two-Way Influence in 
Legislative Elections.87 
Country President Cong. Term  Conflict Freq. (%) Early Term. 
Colombia Samper  1994–1998  6.7   No 
El Salvador Cristiani  1991–1994  0.0   No 
Peru  Fujimori  1995–2000  4.2   No 
Peru  Fujimori  2000–2000  25.0   Yes 
Venezuela Pérez  1988–1993  25.3   Yes 
Venezuela Chávez  1998–2000  19.4   Yes 
Average      13.5%   50% 
 
Additionally, nations with Strong Plurality results in both presidential and 
congressional elections fare better than countries that provide an efficient, two-candidate 
race only for president (a solution proposed by Shugart and Carey). Systems that produce 
an effective two-way race for president, however, do generally coincide with a legislative 
system that is also heavily influenced by a two-way partisan competition. Of the 28 total 
presidential elections where the top-two candidates received more than 84 percent of the 
vote, 22 had at least a weak plurality outcome in the congress. But the six cases that brought 
about an efficient choice for president without carrying this two-party influence to the 
assembly appear especially vulnerable to political crisis. Table 3 shows the governments 
that had their top-two presidential candidates win over 84 percent of the electoral vote, but 
nevertheless maintained fractured legislatures (with top-two parties combining for less than 
                                               
87 Adapted from Negretto, “Presidents and Democratic Performance in Latin America,” 63–92; Dieter 
Nohlen, Elections in the Americas: Volume 2 South America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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75 percent of the vote). The average levels of inter-branch conflict in these systems is even 
higher than those of an Alternate design with less popular presidents, and half of the 
governments of this type resulted in an early termination of the executive or legislative 
branch. While plurality elections for presidential contests appear to be beneficial insofar as 
they facilitate plurality-type results in the assembly, they appear to lose their benefits when 
this influence fails. 
When an effective two-way race for president does not result in a clear split between 
government and opposition factions in the congress, the data indicate that there is a well 
above-average likelihood of conflict between the branches. As Helmke discusses, this may 
be due to the significant disagreement in the electoral mandate for the president and the 
actual amount of partisan support available to carry out his or her policy programs in the 
legislature.88 In particular, as Samper in Colombia and Fujimori in 1995 Peru were both 
able to secure single-party majorities in the legislature, Table 3 indicates that political crisis 
may be especially likely when the president is significantly more popular than any 
congressional group. With a relative imbalance of popular support, these presidents may 
try to steamroll divided and unpopular oppositions in congress. Rather, a system that can 
provide an efficient choice for president without requiring an efficient choice in congress 
may facilitate the rise of populist leaders looking to break free of the established parties 
and the constraining democratic institutions in which they hold power. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
Although this chapter advances an argument for the benefits of two-party systems 
in presidential governments, it does not resolve the academic debate over whether 
presidential or parliamentary regimes are superior. The apparent advantage of the 
“Plurality” regimes to those of the “Parliamentary” design seen in this chapter does not 
necessarily equate to a superiority over a true parliamentary government (which, at this 
time, can only be imagined in Latin America). In Latin American democracies, a majority-
representative cabinet can only mimic one outcome of parliamentary systems. The driver 
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of that coalition, however, remains an independent president with fixed terms rather than 
an empowered assembly to whom the executive is responsible. Though diverse cabinets in 
Latin American governments reflect a president’s willingness to compromise, the strength 
of such a coalition remains constrained by the limitations of presidential coalitions 
discussed by Linz and Valenzuela. 
Nor do plurality-based elections guarantee the two-party outcome that appears to 
benefit presidential systems. Hardened societal divisions may prohibit broad coalitions in 
certain polities. However, as the case study on Chile will show, the dominance of plurality 
incentives can encourage coalitions that overcome traditional political divisions, while the 
influence of PR, especially without a mechanism to force a governing majority coalition, 
can entrench these same divisions deeper into the political process. The evidence from 
Latin America suggests that, in order for democratic institutions to thrive, at some point, 
either before or after elections, broad coalitions must form to span narrow sectoral interests. 
Another problem with plurality systems and SMPDs, as noted by Jones, is the 
potential for political gerrymandering.89 SMPDs that promote two-party systems are not 
only subject to intentional political gerrymandering but give a territorial weight to electoral 
systems that may create unintentional gerrymandering solely as the result social 
geography.90 With partisan divides becoming increasingly segregated between highly 
concentrated (and more politically homogenous) urban populations and dispersed (and 
slightly less politically homogenous) rural populations, this can lead to high numbers of 
“wasted” votes and electoral outcomes out of line with popular vote totals.91 However, 
like many problems in social science, there is a debate to the costs and benefits of such a 
design. As Shugart and Carey describe, “representativeness” can be described in 
geographic terms as the “parochial interests of localities,” just as easily as it can be 
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described in more ideological terms “as the narrow interests of groups within the 
society.”92 Moreover, a more parochially focused legislature may make inter-party 
compromise more common and political polarization weaker. Jones’s concern that 
members of congress do not always align with their party or the president when using 
SMPDs might actually be an advantage that increases the representation of local 
constituencies and provides room for the partisan compromises required for effective 
democratic governance.93 
Lastly, building majority or near-majority popular mandates are not sufficient for 
democratic governments to find success. The ability of the majority to tyrannize the 
minority has preoccupied thinkers from Aristotle to De Tocqueville.94 However, one guard 
against such tyranny, as James Madison described in Federalist #10, is to force the 
government to be responsible to as broad an audience as possible.95 Broader audiences, 
according to Madison, dilute the passions of factions and reduce the likelihood that any 
single group will continuously dominate the rest of society. While Latin American 
countries cannot easily expand territorially or quickly swell their populations to fit the 
republican national ideal of Madison’s vision, requiring a government to be formed by a 
broad majority rather than a narrow minority would be a move in the right direction. 
The conclusions reached in this chapter suggest that multiparty presidential systems 
incapable of institutionalizing broad bases of support, either before or after elections, are 
especially prone to inter-branch conflict and instability. Governments that can be formed 
while only representative of narrow interests seem to impede democratic consolidation and 
political progress in Latin America. If presidential systems continue to be desired in Latin 
America, the region’s democracies would benefit by promoting broadly backed two-party 
outcomes. As the following case studies of Chile and Venezuela indicate, Latin American 
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nations can produce broad political coalitions when systematic arrangements encourage it; 
but these coalitions easily break apart when the incentives otherwise inherent in multiparty 
presidential systems dominate. 
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III. EXTRAORDINARY TO ORDINARY: 
POLITICAL COALITIONS AND DEMOCRACY IN CHILE 
Chilean democracy in the 20th century was stable when its national politics were 
shaped by broadly representative political coalitions. For a time, even with a multitude of 
political parties and the significant political polarization of civil society, electoral 
incentives in Chile encouraged a national vision endorsed by either popular or legislative 
majorities. However, the incentives that encouraged such coalitions were not inherent to 
Chile’s multiparty presidential system; rather, they were the biproduct of a fragile 
institutional arrangement that made Chilean democracy unique. When institutional reforms 
undermined these incentives, Chile’s democracy became increasingly susceptible to inter-
branch conflict and political crisis. 
Chile’s long democratic heritage allows for a clearer understanding of the impact 
that institutional reforms had on the country’s political stability. From 1830 until 1973, 
Chile remained under constitutional rule for all but thirteen months.96 This tradition 
deepened under the 1925 constitution, as the country’s democratic institutions successfully 
confronted the challenges of economic depression, natural disaster, and political extremism 
to maintain regular elections and orderly transitions of power. However, in the 1970s, the 
country’s long-practiced democracy fell victim to a suddenly insurmountable polarization 
of political belief. But the system that collapsed in 1973 was not the same as the one that 
had successfully negotiated the crises of earlier generations; over time, constitutional and 
electoral amendments had made it harder to form broad political coalitions that had once 
been common to the Chilean democratic process. No longer able to bridge polarized 
ideological divides, Chile’s political system itself exacerbated a crisis that would undo the 
country’s storied democracy. 
This chapter describes the arrangement that allowed for the formation of broad 
political coalitions in Chile’s multiparty presidential system. It shows that politicians 
joined across party lines not because these alliances were forced together by the natural 
political cleavages of Chilean society but because of the institutional arrangements and 
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electoral incentives that made broad coalitions likely. However, reforms targeted at 
increasing electoral efficiency also altered the institutional arrangement which facilitated 
political cooperation. As new electoral rules impeded cross-party alliances, and as the 
Chilean assembly became a medium for national rather than parochial political expression, 
partisan fractures encouraged through the legislative PR electoral system filtered into 
national politics. Without its traditional electoral incentives to form pre-election coalitions 
or an institutional mechanism that would require a representative government form post-
election, political bargains became harder to make and political divisions became further 
entrenched. As a result, Chile’s democratic outcomes came to produce governments neither 
responsible to a majority consensus nor capable of producing one. 
A. WHEN PLURALITY RULED: THE ERA OF COALITION POLITICS 
One of the major goals of the 1925 Chilean constitution was to restore to the 
government a more assertive executive following an era of ineffective parliamentary 
rule.97 As Chilean democracy crumbled in 1973, many pointed to the nation’s empowered 
executive and argued that it was the reason for the polarization and political conflict that 
doomed Chile’s liberal tradition.98 However, for much of this period, Chile’s presidents 
labored to build broadly backed popular and legislative coalitions that spanned Chile’s 
historical ideological divisions. Moderated platforms and frequent cabinet reshuffles were 
common as presidents sought to build cross-party alliances to advance their political 
agendas.99 
Initially, a divide between the national interests of the president and the parochial focus 
of the legislature facilitated inter-branch cooperation. The 1925 constitution restored the 
president’s control over cabinet positions and expanded some of the president’s legislative 
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powers from the previous era, giving the president greater control over the executive branch 
and national policy.100 However, the Chilean congress still retained control of the budgetary 
processes that provided it access to an electorally lucrative system of local patronage.101 While 
the presidency inherently became an expression of national policy preferences, electoral 
realities demanded that legislators overlook polarized worldviews to better deliver resources 
to their districts.102 With this division of interests, the legislature and the executive became 
responsive to two separate electoral constituencies. Until 1958, as Shugart and Carey describe, 
“electoral lists in districts were regularly drawn up for expressly local purposes, rather than for 
the purpose of providing voters with a set of ideologically coherent policy priorities at the 
national level.”103 Instead, an independent election for president provided a distinct political 
sphere for national policy debate. While the PR electoral system for members of the Chilean 
congress encouraged a multiparty result, presidential politics, answerable to its own 
constituency, remained largely insulated from the multiparty electoral pressures driving 
congressional outcomes. 
This division of political interests allowed broad coalitions that bridged Chile’s 
fractured political party system to provide voters an efficient choice over national policy. 
Though the 1925 constitution did not create a presidency that would be chosen by a simple 
plurality vote, it nevertheless initially created a system that produced similar electoral 
incentives. The constitution allowed for a president that would be elected to a six-year term 
by an absolute majority of the popular vote; if an absolute majority was not reached, 
congress would decide between the two most popular candidates.104 Because candidates 
would either have to gain a majority or at least form a coalition that would survive any 
post-election bargaining in congress (bargaining that was not uncommon due to the 
parochial rather than ideological focus of congressional members), Chilean presidential 
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candidates were incentivized to build coalitions that were much more representative than 
the narrow interests of their own particular parties.105 During the same period in which 
Chilean congressional races were competitively contested by anywhere between six to 
twelve political parties, presidential races most often presented a choice of two competitive 
candidates.106 
Table 4. Effective Number of Parties in Chilean Congressional and 
Presidential Elections.107 
Date  Nv  Np 
1931    1.9 
1932    2.7 
1933  10.6   
1937  6.9   
1938    2.0 
1941  7.7   
1942    1.9 
1945  6.5   
1946    3.1 
1949  7.4   
1952    2.9 
1953  11.8   
1957  7.4   
1958    4.0 
1961  6.4   
1964    2.1 
1965  4.3   
1969  4.9   
1970    3.0 
1973  2.1   
 
Effective number of parties contesting 
legislative elections (Nv) and effective 
number of presidential candidates (Np). 
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This structure produced presidential contests that offered two competing national 
policy visions, similar to those found in a two-party presidential system. While 
congressional elections from the 1930s to the 1950s were “highly local, centering on 
district-specific and even citizen-specific benefits,” Shugart and Carey describe that, “the 
existence of presidential elections, and especially the early emergence of a plurality 
character to those elections, meant that parties would need to present a broader focus in 
those elections.”108 From 1932 to 1952, presidential electoral coalitions often did just that, 
winning majorities in three of the five presidential elections (1932, 1938, 1942), with 
another falling just short at 47 percent of the popular vote (1952).  
This broader positioning made presidents flexible in searching for support, even 
when they were unable to build an electoral majority backing prior to the election. In 1946, 
for instance, Gabriel González Videla came to office after winning a three-way race with 
the support of only 40 percent of the electorate. Following his election, however, he built 
a cabinet of Radicals, Liberals, and Communists that represented 60 percent of the 
congress. “The president,” Arturo Valenzuela describes, “even sought to bring 
Conservatives into the government, but they balked at the Communist party presence.”109 
In 1958, an even more divided presidential race gave Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez a narrow 
31-percent plurality. However, he too was able to form a majority-representative cabinet 
for part of his administration.110 Executive-legislative ties were further strengthened in 
these arrangements by the requirement that party leadership give official permission for 
party members to join executive cabinets, requiring programmatic concessions from the 
president for party support.111 Moreover, this flexibility allowed for a diverse partnership 
of parties which, as Julio Faundez describes, “made it possible for all the parties in the  
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Table 5. Chilean Presidential Coalitions: Pre-Electoral Support and 
Post-Electoral Cabinets.112 
 
*Only twice was a president unable to form either an electoral majority or a cabinet representative 
of a legislative majority. Once was under the Independent candidate, General Carlos Ibáñez del 
Campo, who led a populist, anti-party movement to a 19-point victory before the movement 
collapsed shortly after the election.113 The other was under the Socialist candidate, Salvador 
Allende, whose presidency precipitated the collapse of the democratic regime. 
+Single-party legislative majority only. 
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political spectrum, from Conservatives to Communists, to be part of the governing 
coalition.”114 Although these legislative coalitions were far from permanent and prone to 
frequent breakdown, they allowed representation of a diverse interest of society in the 
executive when the president could not provide that representation alone. 
While the legislative priority of delivering political pork to constituents facilitated 
political compromise across ideological divides, systematic patronage also was expensive. 
Discontent with run-away spending prompted a series of reforms that upset the fragile 
coalition system. In 1943, congress sought to constrain superfluous spending projects by 
passing a constitutional amendment that limited its own ability to increase the federal 
budget. This amendment gave the president, with strict oversight of an independent 
comptroller, the sole discretion to introduce bills that called for increases in public 
expenditure.115 However, by limiting their own ability to direct federal funds to 
constituents, congressional members reduced the local focus of their offices. The national 
objectives that drove executive branch policy also determined the allocation of new federal 
funds. With a reduced ability to control local outcomes, the role of congress became more 
about approving or rejecting presidential policies than delivering local results. 
Although the 1943 reform was not the most expansive reform to the intuitional 
design of the 1925 constitution, it may have made an immediate impact on coalition 
politics. Chile’s first truly multiparty presidential election came just three years after the 
reform, in 1946. Additional reforms in 1958 and 1970 made inter-party coalitions even 
more difficult to form, leading to the end of Chile’s era of coalition politics.116 
B. THE BREAKDOWN OF PLURALITY INCENTIVES 
After reaching a peak of thirty-six in 1953, the number of parties competing for 
seats in the Chilean congress fell drastically.117 Nevertheless, it became increasingly 
difficult to form broad national coalitions in support of presidential candidates. Perhaps 
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counterintuitively, the coalescing of political parties at the legislative level coincided with 
an increase in the number of effective candidates for president. In 1958, electoral reforms 
further reduced the parochial focus of the Chilean congress, exacerbating the like effects 
of the 1943 amendment. Aided by this institutional reform, the presidential election of 1958 
signaled the beginning of a more rigid tripartite split of Chilean national-policy visions 
(one that many argue is the true expression of Chile’s natural political cleavages).118  
Prior to the reforms of 1958, congressional candidates often participated in cross-
party bargaining to improve electoral prospects. Initially, voters pre-selected ballots 
created by their preferred political party to vote.119 However, the list of candidates that 
appeared on this ballot was not exclusive to card-carrying party members. Federico Gil 
describes that, “some candidates ran at the same time under the banner of two parties that 
were irreconcilably opposed, perhaps from the two ends of the national political spectrum. 
At times clericals, anti-clericals, rightists, and leftists all got together on the same 
[electoral] list, especially in the provinces.”120 Political pacts between regions allowed a 
popular candidate from one party to appear on another party’s list in one district, while the 
favor would be reciprocated in another district.121 With multimember districts, this 
allowed popular candidates to grow support for parties other than their own in return for 
support elsewhere. While ideological divisions were important to political coalitions, 
partisan divisions were in many ways amorphous, allowing individual candidates to shape 
coalitions based on personal rather than partisan beliefs and interests.122 J. S. Valenzuela 
describes that “local pacts occurred as personal political ambitions took priority over party 
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interests, as segments of parties disagreed on whether to support or oppose the government, 
as they discussed which parties should be approached to forge pacts with, or as they decided 
which presidential candidate to support.”123 This arrangement reduced the need for 
congressional members to strictly adhere to partisan positions, instead making it common 
for political candidates to work across party lines to form politically advantageous 
coalitions. 
Importantly, even coalitions based on political calculations and personal ambition 
encouraged presidential candidates to moderate their political platforms to gain support. 
Though promises of cabinet positions could help build alliances with other major parties, 
well-positioned presidential candidates commonly worked to elicit a more diverse range of 
partisan support by building platforms broad enough to attract the alliance of smaller 
parties, even without a guarantee of electoral spoils.124 Electoral success at the national 
level most often required inclusive political perspectives which in turn led to more 
moderate policy positions.125 In the 1930s and 1940s, the Radical Party came to dominate 
Chilean politics by developing moderate policy positions that could attract an array of 
support. “By providing assurances that policies would not go to any extreme,” J. S. 
Valenzuela describes, “the Radicals [a center-left political party] even had the ability to 
draw into the same coalition the Liberals [center-right] and the Socialists and gain the 
Communists’ electoral support as well, as occurred with the election of Juan Antonio Ríos 
[in 1942].”126 Governed by an incentive to gain the plurality, if not majority of the vote, 
presidential candidates worked to knead disparate local interests and particular ideological 
preferences into one broader national vision.  
The same forces that facilitated pre-electoral pacts also made post-election 
coalitions easier to form. Unlike a true two-party system that solidifies pre-electoral 
coalitions by placing them under a common partisan banner, the coalitions that formed 
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before elections in Chile were often highly transient. As Valenzuela describes, “because 
pre-election coalitions were constituted primarily for electoral reasons… they tended to 
disintegrate after a few months of the new administration.”127 However, history shows that 
this breakdown did not much hinder the president’s ability to form new coalitions once in 
office. Rather, as Faundez describes, “the president of the day always managed to form 
another coalition to replace the old one.”128 To help, presidents commonly reshuffled their 
cabinets.129 In fact, there was nearly as much ministerial turnover during this period as 
there was when the congress controlled cabinet posts.130 Chilean presidents initially 
proved themselves just as capable of realignment as the parliamentary system that preceded 
the 1925 constitution—a result no doubt aided by the ideological flexibility and political 
moderation that brought them to office. 
However, faults with the mechanisms that facilitated such political flexibility led 
legislators to enact electoral reform in 1958. Partisan ballots made it easier for those in 
positions of power, such as large landowners and employers, to monitor and influence 
voters, while the arbitrary appearance of many electoral pacts suggested high levels of 
political corruption.131 Reforms to address these issues created a unified national ballot 
that ended the practice of a party-controlled ballot system.132 Legislators also formally 
prohibited electoral pacts in municipal elections and elections for the Chamber of Deputies 
(while this prohibition was expanded to senatorial elections in 1962).133 To many it 
seemed that these reforms brought about the changes necessary to rescue Chile’s political 
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processes from its own damning shortcomings. Gil, in his 1966 publication on Chilean 
politics, describes that these reforms “have brought about the elimination of many vices 
that marred the Chilean electoral system. Principally, they have put an end to party 
coalitions in congressional and municipal elections which had led to so many disreputable 
practices.”134 
Still, the reforms that better categorized political parties also increasingly 
segregated them. As Arturo Valenzuela describes, “while this reform succeeded in making 
pre-election arrangements less ‘political,’ it also eliminated an important tool for cross-
party bargaining.”135 While more programmatic platforms encouraged by these reforms 
helped congressional parties coalesce, the new, more ideological policy expression in 
congress also reified political divisions in Chilean society. Chile’s tripartite electoral 
division was in fact spurred forward by the electoral reform process: “With the 
disappearance of many minor political groups,” Gil writes, “the party system [became] 
tighter and better defined… The trend toward development of three great blocs—the Right, 
the Center, and the Left—has continued steadily, since its beginnings in the twenties, given 
impetus by these electoral reforms.”136  
The sharper ideological divides of the parties made them more policy-oriented, 
breaking down the rigid separation of interest between the branches that had once made 
Chile’s multiparty presidential system unique. Increasingly, Chilean legislative elections 
and presidential elections were competitions over the same interests appealing to common 
political constituencies. As a result, the multiparty incentives of congressional elections 
began to shape the divisions of national politics, upsetting the plurality-derived balance 
that had made Chile’s previous presidential elections an efficient choice between popular 
alternatives. After the 1958 reforms, the noticeable tripartite split of society became 
commonly expressed in the nation’s presidential contests. The result was that two of the 
next three presidents won with the support of only around one-third of the Chilean 
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electorate; and though there was a two-candidate race in 1964, it was the result of a 
coalition of necessity rather than any broadly supported political alignment. 
The results of the lone two-way contest that followed the 1958 reform moreover 
only accelerated the collapse of Chile’s coalition system. In 1964, the fear of a socialist 
presidential victory led to a coalition that made Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei Chile’s 
first majority-endorsed president in over 20 years.137 However, this coalition was not the 
result of an inter-party bargaining process. Instead, it was, as Shugart and Carey describe, 
“a response to the perceived dangers of not forming such a coalition in the presence of 
ideological polarization”—a danger made more immediate after Socialist Salvador Allende 
came within a few percentage points of victory in 1958.138  
Despite the backing of the Right and other anti-communist sectors of society, Frei 
interpreted his 1964 landslide victory as a mandate for his own political program.139 
However, without the cross-party working arrangement that had once been typical, Frei 
found his agenda blocked by a much more nationalized congress, even during the common 
“honeymoon” period immediately after his inauguration. As J. S. Valenzuela describes, 
“The winning presidential coalition would normally participate in the new president’s first 
cabinets and compose the initial main nucleus of his legislative supporters.”140 However, 
this was not the case in 1964, “The centrist and rightist parties,” Gil writes, “alienated by 
the reform proposals of the new President and bidding for a comeback, opposed the 
Christian Democrats bitterly.”141 Rather than moderating his position to form a governing 
coalition, Frei attempted to govern alone.142 The gamble paid off. The 1965 congressional 
elections carried the Christian Democrats to a resounding victory, giving the party the first 
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absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies in Chile’s history.143 With just over 43 
percent of the vote in a five-party field, Frei became convinced of his mandate and could 
now count on the legislative support he needed to carry out his policies. 
With increased control of the government and a perception of unrivaled electoral 
support, Frei and his party sought to augment the executive’s powers and reduce the 
reliance on what remained of the traditional multipartisan logrolling that Shugart and Carey 
had described as the system’s “glue.”144 By 1970, Frei and his party pushed through a 
constitutional amendment that closed the loopholes leftover from the budgetary reforms of 
1943.145 This change further restricted congressional inputs into the federal budget, now 
prohibiting amendments to bills that did not directly pertain to the bill itself. The result 
was, in effect, a line-item veto that removed even the president’s discretion to bargain with 
congress.146 Not only did the congress lose another avenue for localistic expression, but 
this reform also further reduced the ability for the president and the congress to negotiate 
across party lines. 
This additional reform pushed legislative powers even more to the president, 
making the presidency ever more vital a position to hold in the country. As Shugart and 
Carey note, “By 1970 the presidency had been granted such great legislative powers as to 
characterize the regime by the most dominant of presidencies… Thus congressional 
elections took on far less import in the actual making of policy, making conflicts less 
manageable, as the effect was to place ever greater weight on the presidency.”147 Chilean 
reform had caused ideological entrenchment in parties and raised the stakes for the 
presidency to such levels that coalition formation became nearly impossible. When the 
1970 presidential election came around, the zero-sum nature of the contest prohibited the 
anti-socialist coalition that had coalesced in 1964. A three-way division of the national 
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electorate allowed Salvador Allende to claim the plurality of the vote with just 36.6 percent, 
a smaller portion of the vote than his losing effort had gained six years earlier. 
The constraints on Chile’s coalition producing system, first introduced in 1943, 
grew more debilitating from the reforms of 1958 and 1970. As congressional elections 
became statements on the desired direction of Chilean national policy, parties became more 
ideological and less able to compromise. The executive became less dependent upon the 
legislature to enact its political programs and consequentially less dependent on political 
coalitions to advance the executive’s agenda. While congressional elections became 
focused on national issues, they became incapable of shaping national policy. Thus, when 
voters endorsed Allende’s opposition 52–44 percent in the 1973 congressional election, the 
result only further polarized the nation and paralyzed the government.148 Though 
Allende’s coalition saw an increase in vote share compared to the 1969 and 1970 elections, 
it won only 11 of the 25 contested Senate seats and 63 of the 150 seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies—far from enough to build a legislative majority. Instead, the anti-Allende 
coalition (CODE) coalesced to form both popular and legislative majorities but 
nevertheless was unable to shape national outcomes. As Shugart and Carey note, Chilean 
voters were stuck with “a constitutionally powerful president who represented the policy 
preferences of the losers of that congressional election.”149 
C. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND THE FRACTURING OF POLITICAL 
EXPRESSION 
Chile’s politically divided society was not a new phenomenon in 1970, even if the 
intransigence of elite political cooperation was. Despite a massive entrance of eligible 
voters between 1946 and 1970, the ideological divisions of the Chilean electorate remained 
mostly constant.150 The majority of the electorate’s middle- and working-class expansion 
had already been incorporated by the 1930s. Further expansion, starting with women’s 
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suffrage in 1949, followed by the lowering of the voter-age and the elimination of literacy 
requirements, grew the electorate nearly five-fold by 1970; but these adjustments did not 
herald massive electoral shifts.151 “Any analysis of electoral politics for this period,” notes 
Daniel Hellinger, “must account for the stability of the distribution of the vote for different 
factions despite the massive entrance of new voters into the electoral arena between 1946 
and 1970.”152 
Table 6. Chamber of Deputies Electoral Results by Ideological Bloc, 
Chile: 1932–1973.153 
Year Left Center Right 
1932  31.9 35.0 
1937 15.4 28.1 42.0 
1941 33.9 31.0 31.2 
1945 23.1 31.2 43.7 
1949 9.4 47.1 42.0 
1953 14.2 49.0 28.0 
1957 10.7 48.6 38.9 
1961 22.1 44.4 38.4 
1965 22.7 60.3 12.5 
1969 28.2 42.8 20.0 
1973 34.6 32.1 21.1 
Average 21.4 40.6 32.1 
 
Despite the growth of the electorate, the tripartite political division that stalemated 
the Chilean system in the 1970s was not unusual to Chilean politics. As Gil has described, 
this tendency was already apparent in the 1920s.154 Election patterns for the Chamber of 
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Deputies shows that a single ideological bloc could not command a majority share of the 
vote until 1965.155 Moreover, political polarization, even early in the democratic regime, 
was so pervasive that it would structure people’s friendships, school choices, and social 
lives.156 “Elections and politics became nation ‘sport’,” writes Valenzuela, “as parties 
became so deeply ingrained  in the nation’s social fabric that Chileans would refer to a 
Radical or a Communist or a Christian Democratic ‘subculture’…even high-school student 
associations, community groups, universities, and professional societies selected leaders 
on party slates.”157 However, for most of this era, political coalitions were built capable of 
bridging these divides. It was not until the reform of Chile’s institutional practices that 
these divisions became insurmountable. 
The reforms and amendments that undermined Chile’s coalition system were not 
brought about by a desire to make a more inclusive political system or create a system more 
representative of Chile’s “inherent” political divisions. Rather, in line with Laura Wills-
Otero’s argument, the evidence suggests that these reforms were initiated based on political 
calculations by the ruling elite. Baland and Robinson contest that the unified ballot, “with 
its easily anticipated effects on voting in the countryside, was a calculated gamble.”158 The 
congressional debate over the bill, transcribed in the Chilean newspaper, El Mercurio, 
points to the political calculus behind the support of the new law. Quoted in the periodical, 
Socialist Senator Marontes argued that that the law would rectify the corrupt advantage of 
the conservative landowners in influencing the vote: “if that law [that required voters to 
openly choose party ballots] did not exist,” El Mercurio recorded him saying, “instead of 
there being nine Socialist senators there would be 18, and you [the Conservatives] would 
be reduced to two or three.”159 However, it appeared that the gamble did not bring the Left 
the traction that it hoped. “Interestingly,” describe Baland and Robinson, “despite these 
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[electoral] changes, the Conservative Jorge Alessandri won the presidential election in 
1958, principally on a platform emphasizing conservative monetary policies.”160 
While the outcome of the reforms was to split national political expression into 
three, rather than two broad visions, the result actually reduced the representation of the 
less powerful elements of Chilean political society in government. Political coalitions that 
once included smaller parties in the governing majority became rare while the positions of 
the establishment parties strengthened. “It is interesting to note,” writes Faundez, “that the 
end of the period during which broad coalitions could be made as easily as they could be 
unmade was not marked by a dramatic fall in the electoral support of the Radical Party—
the party that had played a pivotal role in the 1930s and 1940s. On the contrary, it was 
accompanied by the disintegration of the two extreme poles of the party system.”161 With 
the ability to form pre-electoral pacts removed in 1958, the nontraditional parties became 
unable to create the pre-election arrangements required to gain representation under the 
D’Hondt PR system that governed Chilean congressional elections. Without a plurality 
system to encourage broad coalitions otherwise, these parties became excluded from 
Chilean politics.162 
Shugart and Carey contend that democracy in Chile failed because the strong 
presidency of Chile left the country unable to adapt to an assembly that became 
ideologically divided. Arturo Valenzuela also believes that Chile’s strong presidency was 
especially problematic: “In Chile,” he writes, “there was an inverse correlation between 
the power of the presidency and the success of presidential government. The stronger the 
president, the weaker the presidential system.”163 Although Frei was successful at 
increasing presidential power in 1970, the structural impediments to Chile’s traditional 
coalition system were apparent prior to his reforms. Moreover, despite the ideological 
divisions of society, it was not inevitable that the divisions of the Chilean congress would 
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become unworkable. For some time, electoral incentives had encouraged cross-party 
cooperation at the legislative branch, while the historical experience shows that the 
plurality incentives of presidential elections were sufficient to reconcile the common 
polarization of society. Even with relatively weak plurality incentives, Chile’s presidential 
candidates were able to overcome Chile’s “troublesome” political splits.  
Nor was weak partisan support, even in combination with Chile’s strong presidency 
enough to derail Chilean democracy. Valenzuela and others also claim, in line with 
Helmke’s thesis, that what was especially disastrous to Chilean democracy was this strong 
presidency combined with weak partisan support. Valenzuela describes that, in Chile, 
“there was an inadequate fit between the country’s highly polarized and competitive party 
system, which was incapable of generating majorities, and a presidential system of 
centralized authority.”164 But presidents in Chile had often been able to generate 
majorities, even with a fractured political system. Valenzuela himself describes Chile’s 
common coalitions, where “accommodation and compromise were also the hallmarks of 
democratic institutions such as the Chilean congress, whose law-making, budgetary, and 
investigatory powers provided incentives for party leaders to set aside disagreements in 
matters of mutual benefits.”165 For generations, Chile was able to resolve political 
divisions to form majority coalitions in spite of the fact the first single-party legislative 
majority was not secured until the 1965 congressional election.166 It was not until 
institutional changes brought about by the discussed reforms that a lack of partisan support 
led to terminal executive-legislative deadlock. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
During the first half of the 20th century, Chilean democracy grew to become a “high 
success.”167 It consistently ranked as one of the world’s top democracies; in 1960 is 
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outranked Great Britain and, in 1965, it was thought to be a stronger democracy than the 
United States.168 Gil, in 1966, describes the institutional resilience of Chile’s democracy 
that persevered despite its flaws: 
A certain national pride in political serenity and a certain political 
sophistication characterized Chilean elections. Many Chileans believe that 
even under the stress of social upheaval or of a government inspired by 
Marxist principles, the country would conduct a “Chilean experiment” 
unique in the context of Latin American politics and quite different from 
the one conducted in Castro’s Cuba. Indeed, the freedom and peace of 
Chilean elections are striking symptoms of political health, though they are 
somewhat paradoxical in view of the country’s grave social and economic 
evils.169 
However, by 1970s Chile’s exceptional democracy started to look ordinary, even in a 
regional context. The same institutions that were able to successfully negotiate conflict for 
40 years suddenly found themselves paralyzed by national political polarization. The faith 
that its people once maintained in the polls disappeared when electoral outcomes in Chile 
no longer represented the electorate’s popular will. Chilean democracy crumbled at the 
same time its majority-producing coalition system failed. 
Early under the 1925 constitution, presidents were able to build political visions 
broad enough for executive-legislative coalitions to be both common and flexible. Chile 
was able to balance a PR legislature with presidential politics because of the distinct 
separation in roles and responsibilities of the two branches. While separated this way, the 
plurality incentives of Chile’s presidential elections were often able to encourage coalitions 
that overcame the fractured ideological divisions within Chilean society and expressed 
through its legislature. When the plurality incentives failed to provide a clear mandate, 
presidents often sought to build legislative support though parliamentary-style cabinet 
coalitions, coalitions made possible because of a parochial orientation that allowed 
ideologically opposed legislative parties to support a common executive. As a result, 
governments could represent the majority interest. However, as this separation broke down, 
Chile lost the unique arrangement that made its system so stable. The nationalization of 
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PR-encouraged partisan divisions found in congress made it easier for a presidential 
candidate to win without appealing to a broad cross-section of society. No longer 
moderated by electoral necessity, presidents also found it more difficult to form majority 
legislative coalitions. This change, however, was not inevitable—it was a result of the 
amendments to the institutional arrangement that governed legislative-executive relations. 
After Chile’s democratic collapse, many Latin American countries adopted a 
majority runoff for their presidential contests to protect against divisive, minority-backed 
presidents. However, Chile’s problems stemmed not from the plurality tradition that 
allowed Allende’s victory but from the contradictions created by a system that impeded 
ideological coalitions in one branch yet demanded them in another. A parliamentary system 
likely would have maintained Chile’s tripartite expression but with an executive dependent 
on a legislative majority. A plurality system for congressional elections likely would have 
encouraged the same broad coalitions once common to Chile’s presidential elections in its 
legislative races, allowing the programmatic alignment necessary both to give voters 
clearer policy options in the polls and to stabilize post-election coalitions. In the end, 
Chile’s presidential problem was not that the office was decided by plurality rule, but that 
the congress was not. Chile, precariously balanced between plurality and PR electoral 
systems, would only remain stable for so long. 
Across diverse historical experiences, competing with different economic, social, 
and political challenges, Chilean democracy has found the most success when electoral 
incentives encouraged coalitions broad enough to represent popular majorities. When 
Chilean democracy returned in 1990, it once again became a success story of Latin 
America. For 25 years, electoral incentives muted the multipolar divisions in society. Not 
until the 2017 presidential election was a three-way competition obvious, notably just two 
years after electoral reforms removed the binomial system that had favored two-party 
competition. Will strong democratic traditions be sufficient for Chilean society to 
overcome its “inherent” political divisions this time? 
65 
IV. ON THE EDGE: THE PRECARIOUS BALANCE OF SYSTEMS 
DURING VENEZUELA’S DEMOCRATIC ERA 
Venezuela’s democracy was born at the end of the 1950s, developed in the shadows 
of Marxist revolutions during the 1960s, and consolidated as the ideological polarization 
of the 1970s tore at its neighbors. By the 1990s, Venezuela had built a reputation as one of 
Latin America’s “most stable and crisis-free examples of presidentialism.”170 However, 
the historical path of Venezuelan democratic consolidation was far from smooth, even if 
the country’s democratic breakdown took many by surprise. Although many factors played 
a part in the collapse of Venezuela’s democracy, this chapter focuses on the forces that 
shaped the nation’s legislative and electoral coalitions and the vulnerabilities that were 
exposed when the governing coalition no longer represented the diverse interests of society.  
Initially built around a multiparty consensus and a power-sharing president, 
Venezuela’s democracy morphed into a system dominated by two major parties in the 
1970s before reverting back to a fractured party system in the 1990s. During these 
transformations, Venezuelan democracy had two main periods of democratic stability—
the first when presidents were determined to build multiparty coalitions to attract the 
support of legislative majorities, and a second when two leading parties expanded their 
bases in an effort to attract a majority backing. However, neither of these arrangements 
were systematically imposed. The Venezuelan constitution of 1961 granted a president 
autonomy in determining the executive branch and PR legislative elections eliminated the 
dependence of political parties on popular majorities to deliver electoral victories. 
Eventually, Venezuelan presidents asserted their prerogatives to independently direct the 
spoils of their office and two parties became dominant though unable to attract the support 
of electoral majorities. The inability to maintain the coalitions produced in parliamentary 
or plurality-presidential governments, coalitions that could represent the interests of a 
majority of Venezuelan voters, led to surges of inter-branch conflict and resulted in the 
destabilization of the democratic regime.  
                                               
170 Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, 196–
97. 
66 
This chapter discusses the evolution of political culture in Venezuela, beginning 
before the establishment of democracy to show how Venezuela’s dominant party system 
was born. After initial failure, a system of compromise and consultation was developed by 
party elites to ensure an inclusive political arrangement that would safeguard democracy. 
Eventually the political incentives of the presidential system came to dominate, raising the 
stakes of the presidential race and causing the multiparty system to condense toward a two-
party system, occasionally producing governing and opposition coalitions more common 
to plurality-presidential systems. When post-election coalitions were guaranteed, like 
common to a parliamentary system, or when two-leading parties competed for electoral 
majorities like in a plurality system, Venezuelan democracy thrived. However, as neither 
of these arrangements were protected by Venezuela’s political system, both would 
eventually fail. 
A. EARLY STRUGGLES: THE PATH TOWARD VENEZUELAN 
DEMOCRACY 
Many of the features that would become central to Venezuelan democracy were 
born from the lessons learned during the nation’s initial struggles with democratic 
expression and rule. Acción Democrática (AD), the political party that would most 
influence Venezuelan politics during the democratic era, emerged well before the nation’s 
first national elections. Formed in the 1930s, AD was a product of a repressive political 
environment fostered by the nation’s military dictators.171 General Juan Vicente Gómez 
consolidated power through the destruction of opposition groups and had effectively 
extinguished organized political opposition through the earlier part of 20th century.172 In 
order to avoid political persecution from Gómez and the military regimes that followed, 
AD grew as an underground movement where secrecy and strict obedience to party 
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leadership were essential to organizational survival.173 AD quietly built up a nation-wide 
political resistance and, in 1945, its disciplined approach paid off. In support of mid-level 
military officers, AD mobilized its partisans to assist the overthrow of General Isaías 
Medina Angarita, seizing police stations and armories across the country on the orders of 
party leadership.174 What followed would be Venezuela’s first ever democracy, a short-
lived, three-year period commonly known as the trienio. 
The early political success of AD furthered the cause of highly disciplined parties. 
New parties that emerged to compete in the 1947 elections, such as COPEI (the Christian 
Socialist party), copied the hierarchal structure that had allowed AD to thrive.175 Electoral 
rules developed for the 1947 elections further favored centralized parties through the 
adoption of a closed-list, proportionally representative system to select legislators. Under 
this system, voters would state their preference for the Senate, Chamber of Deputies, state 
legislative assemblies, and (through 1979) municipal councils with a single vote for a 
political party, with a simultaneous but separate vote for presidential candidates.176 While 
presidential ballots included a picture of the candidate, a single, smaller ballot that included 
just a party’s name, color, and symbol was used for all the remaining offices.177 Selection 
of the actual legislators was the result of a ranked list made by the party’s central 
leadership, ensuring that congressional representatives would be more tied to party bosses 
than to the voting public.178 
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Although AD was extremely successful in the nation’s first national election, 
leading Venezuela’s first democratic government proved to be more of a challenge. The 
1947 election was a landslide victory for AD, which won over 70 percent of the vote for 
both presidential and legislative elections. In response, the party governed as the dominant 
single-party that the system indicated it was. The government pursued a zealous program, 
implementing reforms without regard to the increasing reservations of other powerful 
social sectors. However, AD leadership misinterpreted its wide electoral victory for 
unopposed support and, in doing so, the democratic government quickly made enemies 
with a range of civil institutions, the church, and the military.179 In eschewing the feedback 
of civic society, AD pushed forward not realizing that a growing opposition was 
questioning the legitimacy of not only the government but the very democratic institutions 
that had allowed AD to operate unchecked.180 The consequences were devastating for the 
country’s nascent democracy. In 1947, the military, with the support of the main political 
opposition parties COPEI and URD (Democratic Republican Union), reasserted its control 
over the country. The church praised the “divine” intervention of General Marco Pérez 
Jiménez and the democratic experiment was abandoned.181 
The ten-year interlude between democratic regimes reinforced the importance of 
party discipline in Venezuela, but also forced the party elites to understand that inter-party 
cooperation was required for democratic consolidation in the country. Political repression 
under Jiménez again became severe. AD and the PCV (Venezuelan Communist Party) were 
outlawed, their leadership persecuted, arrested, and exiled.182 However, even COPEI and 
URD were placed under strict surveillance and had their operations forced to the shadows 
by the military regime. The common political persecution of the major parties ended up 
easing the divides between the rivals and opened avenues for cooperative connections 
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though underground movements. The major parties soon agreed that the reestablishment 
of the nation’s democracy was their priority interest.183   
B. DEMOCRATIC SURVIVAL: PARLIAMENTARY COALITIONS DURING 
THE ERA OF TRANSITION 
In 1958, another coup returned democracy to Venezuela and, this time, the 
country’s leading parties were determined not to waste the opportunity. Despite the 
acknowledgement that a more conciliatory approach was necessary to sustain the 
democratic regime, cooperation was easier in theory than it was in practice. Initially, the 
party elite tried to secure a political consensus by nominating a common candidate for 
president. However, months of back and forth on potential candidates without any 
agreement only highlighted the disunity of the major parties. “For two full months of a six-
month campaign,” writes Michael Coppedge, “reports of these partisan disagreements and 
maneuvers were making front-page news every day, contradicting in practice the unity that 
was being claimed in principle.”184 Unable to compromise and form a pre-electoral 
coalition, the parties ended up nominating their own choices and committed instead to a 
broad coalition government after the election. 
At the suggestion of AD’s Rómulo Betancourt, the leader of Venezuela’s still most 
popular political movement, the three leading parties from the 1947 election agreed to 
establish a unity government following the 1958 election. The Pact of Punto Fijo was 
created to ensure the types of executive compromises more commonly seen in a 
parliamentary system of government. The Pact arranged that cabinet posts, congressional 
leadership positions, and governorships (which the president had the right to appoint) 
would be divided proportionally among the three parties regardless of which party won the 
upcoming elections.185 A common political program was also adopted to secure against 
extreme partisanship, and pledges for inclusionary commissions and decentralized public 
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administration were made to ensure that the interests of civil society were reflected in the 
government.186 The impasse in finding a common presidential candidate was resolved by 
limiting the stakes of the presidential contest with the guarantee of a broadly representative 
coalition government after the election. 
Despite the country’s significant plurality influences, Venezuela initially remained 
a multiparty system under this parliamentary-style arrangement. The parties, sure that they 
would be proportionally rewarded in both the executive and legislative branches of the 
government, did not need to coalesce to oppose AD. Instead, the Pact ensured that the 
government would include a representative coalition even if the leading party won a narrow 
victory. The new democracy received an overwhelming popular endorsement in the 
elections of 1958, with a 92-percent voter turnout and with over 90 percent of voters 
supporting the signatory parties of the Pact of Punto Fijo. And, although AD won narrow 
majorities in both houses of congress and the presidency with just under 50 percent of the 
vote, Betancourt built an inclusive executive as promised to ensure the support of the other 
leading parties. 
Envisioning a continuation of this parliamentary-style of government, the 1961 
constitution consciously devalued the presidency.187 The Venezuelan president was 
granted among the most limited legislative powers of any presidential system in Latin 
America;188 his veto could be overridden by a simple majority congressional vote (the 
same requirement to send the law to the president’s desk in the first place), a tool made 
even more feckless by the traditionally tight party discipline that made individual 
defections from the established party line unlikely. In effect, the president’s legislative 
program was dependent upon a congressional majority, theoretically tying the two 
branches together to promote a cooperative and consensual government. As Shugart and 
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Carey describe, “the presidency in [Venezuela] was intended to be little more than an 
arbiter of multiparty coalitions expressed through a powerful congress.”189 
The conception of this design was to further the executive’s dependence on 
legislative coalitions, similar in style to that of a parliamentary model. For the first ten 
years of the new democracy, the observance of the Pact of Punto Fijo made this 
arrangement successful. Election results would determine the share of executive cabinet 
positions, building a governing coalition among minority parties that could represent the 
majority interest. Even with this initial spirit of unity, however, the multiparty coalition 
was difficult to maintain without more systematic ties. Almost immediately in the 
Betancourt administration, the decision to compromise drove away some of the AD’s 
younger and more fervent legislators, leading to two splits in the party.190 By January 
1962, these splits, along with one in the URD, left the administration with a majority in the 
Senate but only 57 of the 129 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.191 The lack of a working 
majority in a true parliamentary system would normally have produced new elections. 
However, with fixed term limits, Betancourt’s agenda simply stalled in the face of a 
majority opposition. It was not until a terrorist attack in September 1963 that the majority 
coalition reunified, called together again by the higher purpose of preserving the fledgling 
democracy.192 
The 1963 elections reflected a much more equally divided electorate among the 
leading parties, with AD candidate Raúl Leoni winning with only 32.8 percent of the 
presidential vote while AD, COPEI, and URD took 32.7, 20.8, and 17.4 percent of the 
small ticket vote respectively.193 Following the election, the ambitions of COPEI’s 
leadership, along with an improving security situation, led the party to leave the Punto Fijo 
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alliance.194 Nevertheless, Leoni was still able to build a majority coalition by granting 
cabinet positions to partisans from both the URD and the National Democratic Front 
(FND).195 This coalition lasted through the beginning of 1968, when both coalition 
partners left the alliance and AD experienced its third and most severe party split. 
Following the loss of the consensual majority, the democracy again limped forward, 
dealing with stalemate and parliamentary crisis that resulted in a much more contested 
political environment.196 
Despite not uncommon strains, the parliamentary coalitions built during this first 
decade carried Venezuela’s democracy through transition. As Shugart and Carey note, 
“From 1958, the date of the founding of the Venezuelan democratic regime and of its first 
elections, until the inauguration of the president elected in 1968, Venezuela was governed 
by coalitions.”197 Despite three coup attempts, a guerrilla campaign led by Venezuela’s 
communist party, and violent terrorist attacks, this informal arrangement prevented the 
partisan excesses that undermined democracy during the trienio not long before.198 
Moreover, the system won broad popular support. Calls for abstention from Venezuela’s 
leftist insurgency were ignored and voter participation in all three elections from 1958–
1968 remained above 90 percent.199 However, the lack of a more systematic embrace of a 
parliamentary government meant that Venezuelan democracy teetered on the edge each 
time its majority coalitions broke down, which they commonly did. Although the 
imperative to protect the democratic system rescued majority coalitions and prevented 
more disastrous crisis during this first decade, there was nothing to preserve the spirit of 
political compromise once the country’s democracy was no longer fundamentally 
threatened. 
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C. AN ALTERNATE COMPETITION: POLITICAL INCENTIVES AND THE 
BREAKDOWN OF PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS 
For the first years of the Venezuelan democracy, the common need for broad 
coalitions to ensure the survival of the democratic regime had made them nearly as 
automatic as in a multiparty parliamentary regime—in both, the preservation of the 
executive (in Venezuela’s case, the preservation of the entire system) depended on a 
consensus backing. A system built around inter-party cooperation nevertheless fell short of 
embracing the parliamentary system that would ensure the continuation of this form of 
government. The spirit of unity that propelled Venezuela’s coalition governments through 
its stormy first few years collapsed in 1968. By then, Venezuela’s democracy appeared 
much more secure, allowing presidential incentives to dominate. COPEI’s first president, 
Rafael Caldera, responded to those incentives and, despite only winning 29 percent of the 
vote, asserted his presidential prerogative to select a single-party cabinet.200 “But by that 
year,” as Michael Coppedge describes, “the democratic regime had been consolidated. 
Coup attempts from within the armed forces had ceased; the guerrilla war was over, and 
its combatants amnestied; and Acción Democrática had lost an election (by the narrowest 
of margins) and handed over power to an opposition party.”201 With the security of 
Venezuela’s democracy on firmer footing by 1968, the multiparty democracy broke down, 
giving way to the political incentives that would shape Venezuelan politics for the next 
twenty years. 
The newly asserted independence of the executive from the legislature altered the 
Venezuelan political landscape. The president was no longer just the “arbiter of multiparty 
coalitions” as Shugart and Carey described it was intended to be, or simply “above politics” 
as Coppedge claims was the founder’s intent.202 The parliamentary arrangement that had 
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fostered multiparty legislative competition and shared executive power was pushed aside. 
What had been a four-party system in 1958 transitioned toward a two-party system by 
1973, as segments of political society coalesced to contest what had become a much more 
consequential presidential election.203 
However, the electoral results of 1968 preceded this new political reality. Instead, 
the 1968 election again produced a multiparty system, only this time without any attempt 
to form a post-election coalition. Caldera’s COPEI, with only 31 and 28 percent of the seats 
in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies respectively, was far from being singularly able 
to control a legislative majority.204 Nonetheless, the system also did not produce a stable 
legislative coalition among other parties, despite AD’s narrow seat lead in the body and 
potential partners with similar programmatic positions. Without the executive catalyst to 
solidify political alliances, coalitions within the legislature instead became ad hoc and 
largely unreliable.205 The result under Caldera was the sort of “alternate” design, 
multiparty presidential outcome that is typically destabilizing to democratic regimes: 
Led by AD, congressional opponents assailed the presidency at every 
opportunity: they removed the executive’s right to appoint members of the 
judiciary (except on the Supreme Court) and placed it in the hands of a 
special panel dominated by opposition parties; they limited government 
borrowing to two-year periods; and they passed a law forcing all 
autonomous institutes and corporations with a majority of shares held by 
the government to appoint union representatives to their boards (AD’s 
strength in the union movement surpassed that of COPEI). AD tried briefly 
to persuade Congress to make Venezuela’s governors elective rather than 
appointed officials, and at one point seriously discussed the possibility of 
changing the constitution itself to a parliamentary system. Because of the 
standoff between the legislature and the executive, Venezuelan politics 
deteriorated into petty wrangling. Bitterness, fragmentation, and empty 
rhetoric became the rule, while the country drifted. Things got so bad that 
there were rumors of “restlessness” in the military.206 
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Without a binding arrangement between the executive and legislature, the 
government found itself constantly in crisis. Both COPEI and AD were unable to work 
with minor parties to build a functional legislative coalition, despite the significant 
autonomy of the congress. Instead, as Coppedge describes, “stalemate was the fundamental 
reality of politics during the Caldera government.”207 Only when the democratic institution 
began to feel fragile again did Caldera relent to form an informal accord with AD 
(beginning a tradition of bypassing minor parties) that in effect “meant only that AD would 
no longer only obstruct its own legislative program.”208 Without a formal arrangement, 
political incentives during the Caldera years followed the skeptical predictions of Arturo 
Valenzuela: political parties standing to get little credit for successful policies under a 
president would rather deny him political gain than risk being attached to his failure.209 
D. INSUFFICIENCIES IN REPRESENTATION IN AN INCOMPLETE 
PLURALITY SYSTEM 
With the guarantee for executive power-sharing abandoned under Caldera, 
Venezuelan politics came to be dominated by the plurality incentives that governed 
presidential elections. A near two-party system emerged despite the PR incentives in the 
legislature due to a combination of concurrent presidential and legislative elections, a 
D’Hondt electoral system with a low district magnitude (two for Senate races), and a 
constitutional guarantee for minority party representation that impeded the cohesion of a 
third party. By 1973, only AD and COPEI could claim a nationwide organization, 
propelling them to the dominant positions among Venezuela’s political parties.210 
However, the combination of PR elections and a closed-list system limited ideological 
diversity within these two dominant political expressions. Though initially the incentives 
to win the plurality-determined presidency encouraged the broadening of the two main 
parties and the incorporation of a breadth of civil society, the legislative parties themselves 
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would never be dependent on electoral majorities without plurality elections for legislators. 
The inability of the parties to adapt to remain representative of the majority interest would 
have severe consequences for the democratic system. 
Initially, in response to the plurality requirements of the now more meaningful 
presidential contests, the two leading parties worked to build broader bases of support. 
“Though AD and COPEI had previously penetrated the rural zones [through the 1960s],” 
describe José Molina and Carmen Pérez, “now they broadened their reach throughout the 
country. The two parties worked actively to develop affiliations, taking advantage of their 
participation in government to build clientlist networks.”211 The increasing competition 
for influence was particularly acute in civil organizations, requiring parties to be responsive 
to the interests of civil society and turning these interest groups into an integral party of the 
policy-making process itself.212 By the 1973 election, “Representation was reasonably 
efficient because parties encapsulated nearly all relevant organizations and interests in 
society,” Michael Kulisheck and Brian Crisp write.213 “Groups that expressed political 
demands were quickly integrated into party structures and became almost corporative parts 
of [AD] and COPEI.” 
The emergence of an attenuated two-party system in 1973 made single-party 
legislative majorities possible and reinforced the alternating cycle of presidential 
leadership, hallmarks of a plurality-presidential system that brought some stability back to 
Venezuela’s democracy. Despite the initial vision of broad, multiparty coalitions, two of 
the next three elections produced an AD president with single-party legislative majorities 
in both chambers of congress. With such a disciplined congress, the president could 
effectively guarantee his party’s support for his legislative agenda. As Shugart and Carey 
                                               
211 Molina and Pérez, 10. 
212 Crisp, “Presidential Behavior in a System with Strong Parties: Venezuela, 1958–1995,” 165, 168. 
213 Michael R. Kulisheck and Brian F. Crisp, “The Legislative Consequences of MMP Electoral Rules 
in Venezuela,” in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds? ed. Matthew Shugart and 
Martin P. Wattenberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 427. 
 
77 
note, “In the end then, Latin America’s most majoritarian—and one of its most stable—
democracies developed largely unintentionally.”214 
However, the lack of plurality legislative elections obviated the need for the parties 
to compete for electoral majorities and reduced the frequency that Venezuelan 
governments could claim coalitions similar to those produced in plurality-presidential 
systems. Although AD at times built a base of electoral support broad enough to translate 
into legislative majorities, COPEI’s support was always far more limited. COPEI’s most 
successful legislative election was in 1978 but, even then, the party won less than 40 
percent of the vote. While COPEI often led a robust opposition and presented a threatening 
political alternative when AD was governing, it was not able to build its own internally 
backed majority while in power itself. Rather than uniting as would typically be forced by 
plurality elections, the opposition to AD remained fractured both for elections and during 
COPEI-led governments. Venezuela thus could be said to approach a plurality system when 
a broadly backed AD leadership secured a legislative majority and a COPEI-led opposition 
provided a meaningful alternative, but it fell much shorter of the mark when this was not 
the case. 
Rather than further broadening their positions by absorbing developing political 
movements into their platforms, Venezuela’s two leading parties relied on systems that 
excluded alternative political expressions. The governing class was able to use the revenue 
from Venezuela’s oil economy to create a system of patronage that tied society to the 
political establishment. The main parties also benefitted from a law that allocated state 
funding to political parties based on previous electoral performance, helping to perpetuate 
the establishment’s advantage while facilitating the suppression of burgeoning political 
movements.215 
Perhaps most consequentially, the constitutional protections for minority party 
representation fragmented the development of political alternatives. The 1961 constitution 
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called for the “proportional representation of minorities,” through a system that would 
provide additional legislative seats based on national vote tallies.216 In the Senate, where 
only the top two parties in each district would receive seats, this provided an “additional” 
seat if a party won 2.38 percent of the national vote; in the Chamber of Deputies, the 
threshold for additional seats was reduced to 0.55 percent of the national total.217 The low 
threshold for representation, combined with the high barriers imposed by the leading 
parties for both regular district seats and especially the presidency, discouraged small 
parties from uniting to challenge the dominance of AD and COPEI.  
Venezuela’s political system struggled to balance two-party stability with a PR 
system that depended on multiple parties to express ideological diversity. As described 
above, Caldera relied on AD instead of minor parties to break stalemate during his 
administration; neither COPEI nor AD were able to form a stable governing coalition 
through minor party inclusion despite each holding over 40 percent of the seats in the 
congress during the Herrera administration from 1979–1984; and, although Carlos Pérez 
implemented a neoliberal package created by independents during his second 
administration, his government ruled without explicit accords with other parties (though a 
late alliance with COPEI in an attempt to shore up waning support would prove disastrous 
for both parties’ electoral chances in 1993 and beyond).218 Without a parliamentary 
mechanism to force majority coalitions, minority party protections led primarily to the 
exclusion of minority parties from the governing conversation. 
E. UNWILLING TO CHOOSE: THE FAILURE OF ELECTORAL REFORM 
AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ALTERNATE DESIGN 
Venezuela’s democracy became stuck between two systems. Majorities would not 
be represented by legislative party coalitions because of the winner-take-all incentives of 
the presidency, and PR legislative elections allowed two parties to dominate without 
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forcing them to compete for electoral majorities. The result was a crisis of representation 
and growing demands for political reform.  
Without political incentives to force change, Venezuela’s leading parties proved 
unable to adapt to an increasingly complex civil society.219 As Jana Morgan describes, 
“AD and COPEI were hierarchical organizations in which certain established interests, 
especially business and labor, were well represented and given privileged status. Labor 
union and professional association members were therefore integrated into the party system 
and able to find effective avenues for their voices to be heard. But people outside these 
established functional groups, such as the urban poor and informal workers, did not have a 
formal connection to the old parties.”220 Toward the end of the 1960s, the urban middle 
class began to form neighborhood associations, groups “developed outside the sphere of 
political parties and [that] challenged the traditional system of clientelistic service 
delivery.”221 These associations opened space for political discourse free from the 
nationalized party structures. However, because AD and COPEI were able to maintain their 
relative positions without incorporating these new actors, the parties also avoided needing 
to be responsive to them.222  
Rather than reacting to the changing interests of their constituents, individual 
legislators were also more attuned to the interests of intractable party leadership than the 
voters they were elected to represent. Because ballots endorsed only parties, not candidates, 
and because the party leadership determined the rank order of the electoral list, parties 
controlled a legislator’s electability far more than the individual voters. As Crisp describes:  
because votes are pooled within each state for candidates on a closed list, 
national-level party elites have strict control over who runs on the party 
label and, more particularly, the order in which candidates appear, so 
individual members of congress have every incentive to promote the party 
line and ignore parochial issues…Rare breaches of discipline are almost 
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always met with very rancorous and public expulsion from the party. These 
factors work to ensure strict discipline within the legislative delegation, 
which in turn assures voters that programmatic promises can be met by the 
governing party.223  
This was true especially after the party splits observed in the early 1960s and often meant 
that individual votes were not even taken, with records only noting whether an item passed 
based on the positions of the parties and their relative strength in the congress.224 
Extreme party discipline prevented any intraparty diversity. While this ensured a 
programmatic party, it also meant that representation suffered in a two-party dominant 
system. As Shugart and Carey have described, “Electoral systems may be scaled by the 
degree to which they represent diversity. That diversity may be expressed in geographic 
terms as the parochial interests of localities, or it may be expressed sectorally as the narrow 
interests of groups within the society…If representation is to be based on group interests, 
such as clashing ideologies or distinct ethnic or religious segments, it need not be at all 
local in nature. It must, however, be a form of proportional representation (PR) based on 
party lists.”225 In Venezuela, centralized control and PR elections made the representation 
national and based on group interests; however, without a mechanism to force a post-
election majority coalition, representation in the government was also generally controlled 
by dominant but narrowly defined minority parties. 
The deficiencies in representativeness were clear to party leaders quickly after the 
end of the parliamentary era. Voter participation, which had been used as an indicator of 
democratic support since the beginning of democracy, had been resoundingly high through 
the Punto Fijo era’s first four elections—in 1973, abstention was only 3.5 percent. 
However, by 1978, voter abstention surged to over 12 percent, an early indicator of voter 
frustration with the system.226 Opinion polls increasingly expressed voter discontent with 
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the unrepresentativeness of the parties; a poll in the early 1970s demonstrated that 81 
percent viewed parties as instruments of “powerful minorities.”227 Rising urban unrest 
made all parties, including AD and COPEI, aware that reform was required to increase 
constituent responsiveness.228  
The first reforms came in 1979, notably before the collapse of oil prices that would 
severely damage the Venezuelan economy during the 1980s. These initial reforms targeted 
municipal elections, providing a distinct ballot and separate election dates to decouple their 
results from national races.229 Though limited, these reforms paved a path to a 
constitutional amendment in 1983 that opened the possibility for municipal council and 
state assembly elections to use something other than the closed-list, PR system still 
mandated for national elections.230 As Crisp and Juan Carlos Rey describe, “The process 
that led to the approval of the amendment would never have been possible without the 
endorsement of the parties, especially [AD] and [COPEI]. They perceived the public 
discontent with the manner in which government affairs had been managed and the 
extremely dominant—and some would say asphyxiating—role that parties had played.”231 
The political elite understood the need for electoral reform. By 1983, surveys 
showed that party affiliation had dropped significantly.232 Under pressure from civil 
society, AD president Jamie Lusinchi formed an independent commission in 1984 to 
“democratize the democracy,” pursuing an effort toward reform that would make the 
parties more transparent and the government more accountable to the people.233 The issue 
continued to be pressed through the 1988 presidential election. Seven presidential 
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candidates, including Carlos Pérez of AD and Eduardo Fernandez of COPEI, pledged to 
support a “national agreement” to enact political reform that would include separate ballots 
for Chamber of Deputies and Senate elections and separate electoral timing for national 
races.234  
Table 7. Evolution of Citizen Alignment with Political Parties in 
Venezuela (percent of respondents).235 
Year 1973 1983 1990 
Militants/sympathizers 48.7 38.4 32.4 
Independents 19.2 38.0 47.0 
Not Interested 32.1 23.6 20.6 
Number of respondents 1,500 1,780 1,500 
 
New legislation did allow for direct election of state governors and other municipal 
positions in December 1989. While municipal councils were decided by an open-list 
system, elections for state governors were determined by plurality rule. For the first time 
since the establishment of the two-party dominant system in 1973, statewide pluralities by 
parties other than AD and COPEI were won and three governorships were taken by 
alternate parties. As Matthew Shugart describes, “the plurality system for these offices 
encouraged broad coalition-building and resulted in normally competitive partisan forces 
coalescing to ‘gang up’ on the AD. The long-suppressed resentments against the major 
parties that exploded in the rioting were translated into some palpable changes by the first 
direct elections for governors.”236 
However, entrenched political interests limited the extent of national-level reform. 
The new congress of 1989 took up electoral reform with support split for remedies among 
the parties. With a broad base of popular support, President Pérez, convinced his party to 
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support a plurality system.237 COPEI, which had initially supported a plurality system, 
switched its support to a mixed-member proportional system (MMP), while the Movement 
toward Socialism (MAS), which had become the third largest party, advocated for an open-
list system.238 In the end, the political establishment chose reform that could satisfy the 
demands of the reformers without endangering the dominant positions of the major parties 
and their leadership.239 Reforms resulted in a MMP system during elections for the 
Chamber of Deputies, where one half of the deputies would be elected from single-member 
districts and the other half would come from closed party lists.240 
However, this compromise approach improved neither sectoral nor parochial 
representativeness. In practice, national party leadership still determined the all candidates, 
even those running in single-member districts, keeping ties to central leadership stronger 
than ties to constituents.241 And though this continued to reduce voter support for the major 
parties, the PR system promised to cushion the blow. Furthermore, these limited reforms 
did little to mitigate the crisis. Instead, as Crisp and Rey surmise, “The failure [of parties] 
to behave differently probably contributed to escalating voter frustration, the election of 
Hugo Chávez, and the further decline of the two parties most closely associated with the 
old system, AD and COPEI.”242 The parties had proven unable to provide meaningful 
reform from inside the system, opening new space for voters to demand reform from an 
external actor.243 
Despite the acknowledged need for change, parties continued their traditional 
practices because reform did not force them to behave differently. Representation was not 
mandated institutionally and lack of representation was not severely punished electorally. 
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Venezuela neither embraced a parliamentary system that would create legislative majority 
coalitions and make executive cabinets responsible to more diverse sectoral interests, nor 
a plurality system that would promote parties both more attached to local interests and 
internally diverse themselves. Lack of progress on these fronts only caused increased voter 
disenfranchisement with a system not interested in translating majority opinion into its 
governing institutions. 
F. POPULAR PRESIDENTS AND UNPOPULAR CONGRESSES: WHEN 
INTER-BRANCH CONFLICT TURNS TO INSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 
While the legislature became increasingly unrepresentative, the ties of the president 
to civil society encouraged the rise of populism and a disparity in the political mandate 
between the branches. Unlike the legislature, the president was not responsible to his 
party’s central leadership. The president was instead responsible to a plurality of voters for 
his office, encouraging him to maintain much closer connections to civil society than the 
legislature could match.244 Not only did these ties give the president increased influence 
over civil interest groups and a better understanding of the “pulse of the population,” civil 
society also looked to the executive branch as the political institution that would be most 
responsive to their own needs.245 Despite the constitutional constraints on Venezuela’s 
executive, these closer popular ties gave the president significant power over the legislative 
agent of the electorate. 
The presidents that followed took advantage of this power disparity. Rafael Caldera 
was elected president in 1993, this time running as “someone with the moral force to clean 
up the current system, do away with corruption, and break the stranglehold of the 
increasingly unpopular ‘political class’.”246 On the legislative side, the results of the 1993 
election looked more like the multiparty results of 1968 than those of the two-party system 
of the past two decades. With unpopular parties in a fractured congress, Caldera looked to 
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bypass legislative checks and appeal directly to the masses to advance his program.247 
Crisp describes the emergence of an increasingly populist strain in the Venezuelan 
president: 
In June 1994 [Caldera] suspended a number of constitutional guarantees, 
including several individual rights, the right to economic liberty, and the 
right to property. Suspension of guarantees gives the president the right to 
issue decrees with the force of law regulating any activity related to these 
rights… Approximately a month later, Congress, with a majority composed 
of AD, COPEI, and Causa R, reinstated all the constitutional guarantees, 
except the right to economic liberty. In an apparently unconstitutional 
move, Caldera immediately resuspended the same guarantees and 
threatened to appeal to the people, again an apparently unconstitutional act, 
if the congress did not back down. After this ultimatum AD dropped its 
support for reestablishing the guarantees in order to avoid a constitutional 
crisis.248 
When a group of law professors challenged Caldera’s move in the Venezuelan Supreme 
Court, Caldera again threatened to mobilize the masses against the other branches of 
government.249 As Crisp describes, “He was able to do this, despite his electoral coalition’s 
minority status in congress, because he had implicitly threated legislators with an autogolpe 
legitimized by some form of appeal to the masses… Caldera’s solution has been 
institutionalized—permanently shifting the balance of power among branches.”250 
The lack of representativeness in the Venezuelan congress resulted in a lack of 
legitimacy of the institution, empowering the presidency as the true voice of the people. 
With the congress unable to claim its own clearly delegated majority mandate, presidents 
became free to exert their leverage with direct appeals to the electorate. In 1998, an even 
more populist and transformative president came to office. Rather than using his popularity 
to build a legislative coalition he could work with, Hugo Chávez won a popular referendum 
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to reform the constitution and concentrate power around the executive, leading to the end 
of Venezuela’s representative democracy.251 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
After 40 years, Venezuelan democracy became vulnerable to collapse not because 
its citizens tired of free political expression, but because their established democratic 
institutions no longer adequately voiced Venezuela’s popular will. Although PR elections 
were maintained as a “general principle” of Venezuelan democracy meant to mandate 
political inclusion, in practice the system led to the fracturing and exclusion of alternative 
political visions by the governing elite. Deficiencies in representation created a crisis of 
legitimacy for the Venezuelan congress, reducing public attachment to the institution and 
creating an environment that would allow for the dismantling of one of South America’s 
most venerated democracies. 
The Venezuelan case study shows the difficulties in forming representative, 
multiparty coalitions in presidential systems. Even in a democracy born out of the failures 
of unilateralism, one that prioritized consensus and consultation, post-electoral coalitions 
consistently fractured before the end of the elected term. The glue of the system was the 
common understanding that cooperation was required to preserve democracy (and the 
elected positions of the political class). However, the political incentives of presidential 
politics won out as soon as democratic backsliding no longer seemed likely. Common to 
presidential systems, Venezuela’s executive came to assert its independence from the 
legislature to fulfill its own electoral mandate. Without an executive predisposed to bind 
together a governing legislative coalition, Venezuela’s political elite struggled to unite 
disparate parties into majority governments, even with strong partisan pluralities in the 
legislature and a congress that could legislate independently of the president’s interests.252 
Although the development of a near two-party system encouraged both alternation 
of governing parties and semi-regular majority governments that stabilized Venezuela’s 
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presidential democracy, the plurality nature of the system was incomplete. PR elections for 
the Venezuelan congress did not demand that parties compete to represent the majority of 
the electorate. Instead, as a result of its PR system, AD and COPEI were allowed to 
dominate despite being ideologically and sectorally exclusionary, rather than parties forced 
to build broad alliances and accept increased internal party diversity.253 Centralized 
control and strict party discipline limited the ability of individual legislators to adapt to 
grassroots movements and to incorporate the changing interests of civil society into the 
government. As an AD party leader later explained, in reaction to the changing electorate, 
AD “was completely unprepared and did not try to include new people or new groups.”254 
But the proportional system did not substantially punish parties unable to represent the 
broad interests of society on their own. Although AD occasionally built a broad popular 
backing that, against a significant COPEI-led opposition, allowed plurality characteristics 
to stabilize the presidential government, this relationship was not electorally developed 
into a mature plurality system. Instead, civil society advanced and, without electoral 
incentives to force more change, AD and COPEI’s inability to incorporate new political 
interests led an increasingly disenchanted public to look elsewhere for representation. 
Centralized control and extreme party discipline also ensured that the legislature 
remain an expression of national interest, built to be responsive to the same constituency 
that elected the executive branch.255 Not only did this reduce the ties to local constituents 
that could make the parties more responsive, it made both executive and legislative 
branches subject to the same source for their democratic legitimacy. While this facilitated 
cooperation between president and congress when the two were aligned, it also gave 
recourse for popular, anti-establishment presidents to claim to represent the true will of the 
people over a politically divided legislature.  
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As described here, this outcome, according to James Madison, undermined many of the benefits of the 
separation of powers by denying a competing check of one branch on another’s power. 
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Democracy coalesced in Venezuela when majority-backed post-electoral coalitions 
formed the government. It stabilized as a presidential system when two major parties 
broadened their bases to make possible near-majority support, alternating governments, 
and single-party congresses. However, because proportional electoral reward did not force 
parties to compete for majority electoral backing and because presidential independence 
did not mandate the development of majority post-electoral coalitions, Venezuela was 
unable to guarantee the arrangements that supported its democratic regime. Each time the 
governing interests narrowed, either through the collapse of a political coalition or the 
inability of the governing party to attract a broad base of support, the weakness of 
Venezuela’s democracy was exposed. In short, democracy in Venezuela thrived when its 
presidential system most closely reflected that of a parliamentary system or that of a 
plurality system. However, when it got stuck between those more stable positions, 
Venezuelan democracy teetered toward collapse. 
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V. IN SEARCH OF MORE RELIABLE DEMOCRACIES 
In Latin America, the arrangement that a government uses to determine its 
governing coalitions plays a significant role in determining the stability of that nation’s 
democracy. Some of the region’s presidential systems find success by building broadly 
backed coalitions through the inclusion of multiple legislative parties into the executive 
cabinet, similar to a parliamentary system. Presidential systems that utilize pre-electoral 
coalitions to incorporate diverse political interests into a single party or political pact, 
forming an essentially two-party system, generally create an even more stable solution. 
However, a presidential system that determines its legislature using proportional 
representation does not systematically encourage these types of broadly backed coalitions. 
Instead, without electoral incentives to coalesce policy visions before elections or 
institutional mechanisms to ensure the formation of a majority coalition after the election, 
PR-presidential systems more often create multiparty outcomes that are especially prone 
to inter-branch conflict and political crisis. 
The near universal incorporation of proportionally representative legislatures in 
presidential democracies has made it difficult to determine the effect that PR has on 
presidential system stability. With the United States and the Philippines as the only two 
presidential nations that use plurality rule for legislative elections, and with most PR-
presidential regimes not yet considered to be stable democracies, many who analyze how 
electoral systems influence democratic stability draw their conclusions from an almost 
exclusively parliamentary data set.256 Of course, parliamentary regimes systematically 
incorporate multiple parties into a governing coalition in a way that presidential systems 
do not. Moreover, plurality rule also interacts very differently with a legislative system that 
inherently becomes nationalized as the formulator of the executive than it does with one in 
which the executive is independently derived. Instead, plurality legislative elections in 
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presidential systems characteristically promote the expression of local interests and 
political parties that internally accommodate a range of diversity typically represented by 
multiple parties in a parliamentary system.257 Without a way to further differentiate 
between presidential governments, many critiques of presidentialism draw general 
conclusions without addressing the institutional variations that can make presidential 
systems as capable of representing a majority consensus as parliamentary regimes.258 
Both parliamentary and plurality-presidential governments promote the formation 
of majority governing coalitions. Parliamentary systems build an executive branch that is 
produced by, and responsible to, a legislative majority. The winner-take-all stakes of 
plurality elections characteristically result in the formation of a broad, popular coalition to 
back a leading candidate and a single, coalesced opposition that forms behind a principal 
challenger;259 in plurality-presidential governments, this produces a two-party system with 
both the president and the majority legislative contingent electorally dependent upon broad 
popular support. As a result, coalitions representative of a democratic majority (or at least 
a near majority) are required either institutionally (in parliamentary systems) or electorally 
(in plurality-presidential systems). 
A system that combines proportional representation and presidentialism, however, 
discourages majority coalitions electorally and does not demand them institutionally. 
Proportional electoral reward removes the need for legislative candidates and parties to 
form majority-backed coalitions before elections; however, without the need to create a 
majority coalition to determine the executive, there is also little to tie a majority governing 
coalition together after an election. An independently elected president is not responsible 
to parties other than his own for his election, and politicians outside of the president’s party 
are not responsible for the success of the executive government. The result is often minority 
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government with increased tension between the branches and increased popular discontent 
with democratic outcomes.  
To better distinguish between the variety of presidential systems, this thesis 
advances a new method of classification for presidential democracies. This method 
considers the diversity within PR-presidential systems, differentiating between regimes 
based on the plurality, parliamentary, or alternate coalition forces that determine the 
government. This classification system allows for a more nuanced comparative analysis of 
presidential systems and accounts for distinctions within constitutional systems as well as 
between them. By accounting for this diversity, political scientists can better understand 
which institutional arrangements contribute to democratic success and better predict when 
democratic systems may be at an increased risk of political crisis and, potentially, regime 
breakdown. 
The results in this thesis indicate that institutional design is tremendously 
consequential in determining democratic stability. Through the analysis of the Latin 
American region, as well as through a more detailed look at two of Latin America’s 
notable, long-lived democracies, democratic systems are shown to have less inter-branch 
conflict and be less prone to institutional breakdown when they are subject to the same 
coalition incentives that are forced in parliamentary or plurality-presidential systems. 
Unfortunately, in Latin America’s presidential systems, like most presidential systems 
around the globe, the combination of proportional representative legislative elections and 
the independent election of the executive often impedes the formation of the type of 
majority coalitions favorable to democratic success. 
A. WHEN PRESIDENTIALISM FAILS 
The experiences described in the preceding chapters show the perils of not formally 
institutionalizing arrangements that produce broadly backed political coalitions. Both Chile 
and Venezuela instead relied upon special circumstances to achieve results otherwise 
readily produced by plurality and parliamentary systems. For some time, the distinct 
parochial interest of legislative politics allowed the plurality incentives of Chilean 
presidential elections to shape the country’s national political expression into two broad 
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competing visions. Venezuela, on the other hand, relied on a cooperative pact to form 
parliamentary-style coalitions after elections. Without institutionalizing these coalitions by 
embracing either a plurality or parliamentary system, however, the countries also made it 
more likely that these arrangements would collapse. In Chile, the lack of plurality 
incentives in the legislature gave room for a more fractured and polarized political 
expression as the legislative interest was nationalized. In Venezuela, presidential incentives 
came to dominate, breaking-down the tradition of post-electoral coalitions that initially 
secured its democratic regime. Over time, these once stalwart democracies became 
increasingly susceptible to the political conflict and democratic instability commonly 
associated with multiparty presidential systems. 
While plurality elections for the president may encourage broader electoral 
coalitions for presidential contests, regimes that have popular presidents but maintain 
fractured congresses nevertheless also appear more crisis prone than two-party systems. 
Both the comparative analysis in Chapter II and the discussion of Venezuela in Chapter IV 
indicate that, when the popular mandate of the president significantly outstrips that of any 
single party in the legislature, there is an increased likelihood of populist, anti-
establishment presidents and a resulting increase in the risk of inter-branch conflict and 
institutional breakdown. The Chilean experience discussed in Chapter III indicates that a 
system that combines significant multiparty expression in the legislature with plurality 
presidential incentives may only be stable if the two branches are responsible to distinct 
constituencies—in effect if legislative races remain dominated by parochial interests while 
plurality presidential elections are capable of independently determining national-level 
coalitions.  
Even when the plurality effects of presidential contests filter into legislative 
elections, the risk of inter-branch conflict appears to increase substantially if this influence 
is short of what is typical for a plurality-presidential design. Chapter II indicates that the 
rates of inter-branch conflict and political crisis increase if the top two parties in a 
presidential system are together unable to win 80 percent of the legislative vote. 
Additionally, contrary to the views of many scholars, a system that protects for minor party 
representation in a two-party dominant system may neither provide increased flexibility 
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for the leading party nor increased representation through minor party participation in 
governing decisions.260 Instead, as observed in the Venezuela case analysis, minor parties 
may rarely be incorporated in the government as part of a compromise majority coalition. 
Although minor parties can provide space for ad hoc coalitions on particular issues, the 
lack of minor party incorporation in Venezuela meant that stalemate was still common, 
even when the leading party was just short of a majority in the legislature.261 
B. WHEN PRESIDENTIALISM SUCCEEDS 
Although the challenge of presidential democracy is clearly illustrated in these 
pages, it also appears clear that the types of coalitions that do promote democratic stability 
can be institutionally driven in a range of political environments. Political movements in 
both case studies showed a ready ability to adapt to the incentives that determined whether 
or not majority-producing coalitions were produced. The results from this thesis indicate 
that, even when ideological or sectoral cleavages do not favor a two-party outcome, 
electoral and institutional rules and agreements may be able to bridge what otherwise 
appear to be rigid social divides.  
The evidence from both Chile and Venezuela shows the particular importance of 
institutional mechanisms in determining the development of political coalitions and 
demonstrates how democratic stability varied as a result. Chile’s democracy was stable 
when it was able to overcome the traditional tripartite splits of society to build broader 
popular coalitions behind two leading presidential candidates. Plurality incentives in 
Venezuela also were sufficient to coalesce a multiparty system into one dominated by two 
parties, increasing the stability of the democracy though PR legislative elections prevented 
a more thorough consolidation. The Venezuelan experience additionally demonstrates the 
perseverance and potential strength of a multiparty system when political elites subscribe 
to a parliamentary-style power sharing agreement, but the fragility of such a system when 
they do not. 
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Significantly, political coalitions in these case studies were not fractured by already 
established crisis but instead broke down as a result of deliberate actions initiated by 
political leaders. The Chile case tells a story of gradual reform that reduced the plurality 
influence of presidential elections on national politics and inadvertently limited the ability 
of politicians to bridge ideological divides. The Venezuelan experience describes how a 
lack of formalized arrangements allowed established coalitions to atrophy, first as 
presidents discarded legislative coalitions and then as parties neglected electoral ones. 
However, political actors could only abandon these majority-producing arrangements 
because their PR-presidential systems did not systematically demand them. In both Chile 
and Venezuela, political conflict resulted in democratic crisis only after their governments 
came to better reflect the “alternate” design more typical of Latin American systems. 
Observations both across the Latin American region from 1978–2002 and from the 
two case studies presented in this thesis indicate the importance of systematically 
encouraged coalitions in determining stable democratic governments. Consistent results 
are noted throughout this analysis, suggesting that the positive relative effects of plurality 
or parliamentary coalition types are present despite variation in levels of presidential 
strength and independent of other cultural or socio-economic factors.  
C. LESSONS LEARNED 
Broad and representative political coalitions make democratic success more likely. 
However, it is not only parliamentary regimes that can produce such coalitions. Plurality 
elections stabilize presidential systems because, like parliamentary arrangements, they 
build into the government coalitions that are generally representative of the preferences of 
the majority of the electorate. Systems that build governments unable to ensure such 
representation are more likely to find friction between branches and reduced levels of 
popular support for their democratic institutions.  
Plurality-based presidential systems have the ability to moderate governing 
outcomes and represent a diverse range of local interests. Arturo Valenzuela considers the 
“politics of accommodation” that had allowed Chilean political coalitions to survive to be 
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a mere accident of centrist politics.262 However, this spirit of compromise was not the 
altruistic pursuit of Chilean politicians but the result of an electoral reality that demanded 
that presidents appeal to interests beyond their own narrow ideological bloc. Additionally, 
plurality legislative elections in presidential systems not only encourage legislative 
bargaining and policy compromise that further reduces polarization, they also help provide 
the legislature with a distinct constituent responsibility that eases the tension between 
executive and legislative branches. Venezuela’s political institutions came under attack 
when the president became significantly more popular than any unified opposition in the 
legislature; Chile’s institutions came under attack when a unified opposition became 
significantly more popular than the president. However, distinct constituencies reduce the 
direct competition over the same popular mandate. Instead, the separate responsibilities of 
the Chilean congress earlier in its constitutional era show how distinct popular legitimacies 
can safeguard branches from extra-constitutional encroachment. It is when one branch can 
claim to be clearly more representative than another among the same constituency that 
inter-branch conflict can quickly turn into more volatile political crisis. 
Presidential systems are often dismissed as unreliable and plurality elections are 
often assumed to be unrepresentative. However, the experience in Latin America shows 
that presidential systems can be stable and ideological divisions can be bridged when 
representative, two-party systems emerge. Though proportional representation ensures a 
greater number of parties, in presidential systems, plurality elections are more likely to 
ensure a more diverse governing coalition. For democracy to succeed, this diverse 
representation is required. Unfortunately, for the vast majority of presidential democracies, 
proportionally representative electoral systems make this outcome less likely. Many U.S. 
alliances around the world depend on the success of a partner nation’s democratic 
institutions. Democracies that seek stability while balancing proportional representation in 
a presidential system may be in for an uphill fight. 
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